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The Structural Change of Manufacturing 
in Hungary, 2008–2014
BENEDEK NAGY – IMRE LENGYEL
After the fi nancial crisis of 2008, there was an increased focus on industrial 
restructuring and reindustrialization in many countries including Hungary. In our 
study, with the adaptation of Tregenna’s method, we analyze the transformation of 
the structure of Hungarian manufacturing based on employment and gross value 
added, considering the 13 manufacturing sub-sections from 2008 to 2014. We 
classify the sub-sections into growing, stagnating and weakening groups. Following 
the analysis of the sub-section groups, we also describe the changes of particular 
background factors, such as investments, export, foreign direct investment and the 
composition of employment.*
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) code: E22, E23, E24, J21, L60.
Introduction
After the crisis originating from the fi nancial sector in 2008, the economic 
policy of several countries focused on promoting the real sector, manufacturing 
in particular. Various resolutions were taken in the European Union on boosting 
manufacturing activities, on “reindustrialization” (EC, 2010; 2014). The current 16% 
share of manufacturing activities is proposed to be increased to 20% by 2020, the 
* The Hungarian version of the article was published in Külgazdaság, 2016, Vol. LX, No. 9–10, 
pp. 3–27 (Nagy Benedek – Lengyel Imre: A feldolgozóipar szerkezetváltása Magyarországon 2008 és 
2014 között).
Translation checked by Chris Swart.
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explanation emphasizing that 80% of the EU’s export is provided by industry and that 
industry can stimulate a wide range of related services (Győrff y, 2015). This shift can 
be observed in the majority of developed countries, the former deindustrialization 
was replaced by reindustrialization in economic policies, encouraging high value 
added knowledge-intensive activities, rather than traditional manufacturing ones 
(Westkamper, 2014).
Reindustrialization as a governmental concept emerged in Hungary as well: 
industry’s 26.7% share of the country’s GVA in 2014 (out of which manufacturing 
represents 23.5%) is intended to be increased to 30%; to this end the Irinyi Plan 
was introduced in the spring 2016. The professional opinions on reindustrialization 
concepts are mixed, there are skeptical and opposing opinions besides supporting 
ones (Botos, 2010; Bod, 2013; Lux, 2012; Uliha–Vincze, 2014; Valentinyi, 2014).
In our paper, we examine the changes in the structure of Hungarian 
manufacturing based on the methodology applied by Tregenna [2009; 2013]. In 
her research on de- and reindustrialization she relied on data on employment and 
GVA analyzing labor productivity and labor intensity, and the changes of these 
indicators. Tregenna studied the structural change of diff erent countries and the 
role of manufacturing in this process; we adapt her method on the sub-sections in 
manufacturing in Hungary. In the analysis, we consider 2009 as the base-year. Due 
to the switch to the TEÁOR’08 (NACE 2008) classifi cation, comparable data at sub-
section level are consistently available from 2008, but as a result of the downturn 
caused by the crisis, in 2008–2009 there is a so-called “structural break” in the 
data, thus the processes of the previous period changed fundamentally. First we 
describe the situation of manufacturing and its sub-sections in Hungary, then we 
present our calculations related to the structural transformation of the sub-sections, 
as well as our typifying of the sub-sections and their specifi cities. The end of the 
study reviews some important background factors of the presented structural 
change of manufacturing such as investments, export, foreign direct investment 
and the composition of employment.
Hungarian manufacturing and its sub-sections
In the analysis of the structural change of manufacturing, as well as de- and 
reindustrialization, usually two basic indicators are taken into consideration: number 
of employees and GVA (Barta et al., 2008; Cristopherson et al., 2014; Szirmai, 
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2012; Tregenna, 2014; Weiss, 2002). In the detailed analysis, we also analyze labor 
productivity calculated from these two indicators, and will also use further indicators, 
e.g., the change of sales and export in particular.
Figure 1















Note: The data of manufacturing export, labor productivity, domestic sales and GVA are volume 
indices.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the HCSO STADAT 2.1.30; 3.1.4; 3.1.5; 4.2.8; 4.2.10 tables 
(downloaded: 03/21/2016).
The evolution of domestic manufacturing can be divided into three diff erent 
stages, if we consider a longer period, from the accession to the European Union in 
2004 (see: Figure 1). Between 2004 and 2007, GVA, labor productivity and export 
sales increased dynamically, while employment gradually decreased. Manufacturing 
was halted in 2008, and substantially dropped in 2009; there is an evident “break” 
in the case of each indicator. The third stage takes place from 2010, export became 
dynamic again, while the other indicators essentially stagnated, it was only in 2014 
that GVA increased and labor productivity improved. In our opinion, however, 
the tendency indicated by the data is not reindustrialization; the boost in export 
refers primarily to a transformation within manufacturing, to a structural change. 
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Apparently, structural change is continuously ongoing in industry, but a substantial 
transformation usually takes place over a longer period, only particular signs are 
present in the shorter period we analyze.
In our study, we examine the structural change in manufacturing for 13 sub-
sections based on the TEÁOR’08 (NACE 2008). We considered the employment 
number as the number of staff , our database includes full-time and part-time manual 
and non-manual workers employed by organizations with more than 4 employees 
from the dissemination database of the Hungarian Central Statistical Offi  ce. GVA is 
real value added on a 2008 base, which we calculated using price indices calculated 
from values added at current prices and at the price of the previous year for each 
year, taken also from the dissemination database of the Hungarian Central Statistical 
Offi  ce. 
Employment number decreased substantially (by 3.7%) in the total national 
economy in 2009 (see: Table 1). Following slight fl uctuations, nationwide employment 
exceeded the level of 2008 by about 60 thousand people in 2014. Employment number 
in manufacturing was below the value of 2008 in both 2013 and 2014, however, it 
outperformed the value of 2009 in both years, by 28 thousand people (by 3.6%) in 
2014. The share of manufacturing in employment amounted to 24.8% in 2008, while 
only 22.7% in 2014, thus manufacturing declined in the national economy (although 
its proportion slightly increased in 2014 compared to the previous years). 
By manufacturing sub-sections, employment number changed to a minimal 
degree between 2009 and 2014 (see: Table 1). There are four sub-sections 
[Manufacture of machinery and equipment (CK), Manufacture of transport equipment 
(CL), Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products (CE) and Manufacture 
of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products (CF)] where the 
fi gure of 2014 exceeds that of both 2008 and 2009, i.e., in these sub-sections the 
number of employees grew, while in others it stagnated or substantially decreased 
[Manufacture of textiles, apparel, leather and related products (CB), Manufacture 
of wood and paper products, and printing (CC), Manufacture of coke and refi ned 
petroleum products (CD), Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 
(CI) and Manufacture of electrical equipment (CJ)]. 
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Table 1




Number of employees, ’000 Change, %





Manufacture of food 
products, beverages and 
tobacco products CA 101.6 96.4 97.4 95.7 94.2 94.0 97.0 95.5 100.6
Manufacture of textiles, 
apparel, leather and 
related products CB 54.5 46.0 43.2 43.2 43.1 42.0 41.9 76.9 91.0
Manufacture of wood 
and paper products, and 
printing CC 43.5 39.0 39.8 38.6 36.4 36.3 38.4 88.2 98.4
Manufacture of coke, 
and refi ned petroleum 
products CD 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.1 5.9 90.6 92.8
Manufacture of chemicals 
and chemical products CE 13.5 13.0 12.5 13.8 12.6 12.7 13.5 100.1 103.5
Manufacture of 
pharmaceuticals, 
medicinal chemical and 
botanical products CF 16.1 15.7 15.9 16.6 16.7 17.1 17.6 109.4 111.8
Manufacture of rubber 
and plastics products, 
and other non-metallic 
mineral products CG 74.9 63.4 60.7 62.5 60.3 60.4 63.7 85.1 100.5
Manufacture of basic 
metals and fabricated 
metal products, except 
machinery and equipment CH 85.9 71.0 67.2 73.0 73.0 74.9 79.1 92.0 111.4
Manufacture of computer, 
electronic and optical 
products CI 60.3 51.6 57.6 57.5 51.7 48.2 41.5 68.9 80.4
Manufacture of electrical 
equipment CJ 54.2 45.7 37.2 37.0 36.2 37.1 38.9 71.8 85.1
Manufacture of 
machinery and equipment 
n.e.c. CK 45.2 43.1 48.0 57.9 57.3 56.1 56.8 125.8 131.7
Manufacture of transport 
equipment CL 86.0 66.9 67.9 70.0 72.4 78.8 86.6 100.8 129.5
Other manufacturing, and 
repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment CM 43.5 48.0 46.7 49.4 49.1 48.9 47.3 108.7 98.4
Manufacturing C 685.4 606.3 600.3 621.5 609.4 612.6 628.2 91.6 103.6
Total A-S 2761.9 2660.7 2701.9 2691.5 2674.1 2700.2 2823.1 102.2 106.1
Source: Authors’ collation from the dissemination database of the HCSO (downloaded: 09/04/2015).
Külg 3-4.indb   7 2016.12.06.   11:22:03
8
Benedek Nagy – Imre Lengyel
In the case of the data on employment number, two infl uencing factors need 
to be mentioned: public employment and people working abroad. As our study is 
limited to manufacturing, we consider that the infl uencing eff ect of these factors is 
not signifi cant in this context.1
Figure 2

















Note: CA = Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products, CB = Manufacture of 
textiles, apparel, leather and related products, CC = Manufacture of wood and paper products, and 
printing, CD = Manufacture of coke and refi ned petroleum products, CE = Manufacture of chemicals 
and chemical products, CF = Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical 
products, CG = Manufacture of rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products, 
CH = Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment,  CI 
= Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products, CJ = Manufacture of electrical equipment, 
CK = Manufacture of machinery and equipment, CL = Manufacture of transport equipment, CM = 
Other manufacturing, and repair and installation of machinery and equipment.
Source: Authors’ collation from the dissemination database of the HCSO (downloaded: 12/15/2015).
Only a few sub-sections were able to increase their GVA from 2010 (see: Figure 
2). The manufacture of transport equipment (CL), the manufacture of computer, 
1 For more details about the methodological issues related to taking account of the Hungarians 
working abroad and the foreign nationals working in Hungary, see Lakatos [2015].
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electronic and optical products (CI) and other manufacturing, and repair and 
installation of machinery and equipment (CM) expanded with slight fl uctuations but 
dynamically. The output of several sub-sections essentially stagnated (CA, CB, CE, 
CF CG, CH, CJ and CK), while the manufacture of wood and paper products, and 
printing (CC) and the manufacture of coke, and refi ned petroleum products (CD) 
dropped. The change in employment number and the development of GVA both 
imply that there is a structural change in progress in manufacturing; in particular, 
the manufacture of transport equipment strengthened its positions considerably.
Figure 3

















Note: CA = Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products, CB = Manufacture of 
textiles, apparel, leather and related products, CC = Manufacture of wood and paper products, and 
printing, CD = Manufacture of coke and refi ned petroleum products, CE = Manufacture of chemicals 
and chemical products, CF = Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical 
products, CG = Manufacture of rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products, 
CH = Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment,  CI 
= Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products, CJ = Manufacture of electrical equipment, 
CK = Manufacture of machinery and equipment, CL = Manufacture of transport equipment, CM = 
Other manufacturing, and repair and installation of machinery and equipment.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dissemination database of the HCSO.
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GVA per employee, i.e., labor productivity, developed in diff erent ways in diff erent 
manufacturing sub-sections (see: Figure 3). It increased signifi cantly only in two 
sub-sections: in the manufacture of transport equipment (CL), where employment 
returned to the level of 2008, and in the manufacture of computer, electronic and 
optical products (CI) sub-section, where, on the other hand, employment signifi cantly 
dropped. In the majority of the sub-sections, labor productivity stagnated, while it 
decreased in the sub-sections of the manufacture of coke, and refi ned petroleum 
products (CD), the manufacture of chemicals and chemical products (CE), and the 
manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products (CF). 
The review of the key indicators of manufacturing and its sub-sections shows 
that a structural change has started, but the various sub-sections are developing 
in diff erent ways. This transformation can be grasped by examining the change in 
employment number and GVA.
The methodology of the analysis of the structural change in manufacturing
Tregenna [2009, 2013] studied de- and reindustrialization as the change of the 
employment number in manufacturing in various countries, decomposing it into two 
components. During a process of deindustrialization, employment in manufacturing 
in a country can decrease, on the one hand, because manufacturing produces less 
value added (i.e., the sector shrinks as a whole): she calls this the sector-growth eff ect. 
On the other hand, the number of employees in the sector can decrease because the 
productivity of workers has increased and the sector has become less labor-intensive: 
this is what she calls the labor-intensity eff ect. She argues that the situation in a 
country is more favorable if a decrease in the manufacturing employment number 
takes place so that the entire sector shrinks but labor productivity grows, rather than 
for example, if the opposites of these two happen.
We reinterpreted Tregenna’s decomposition within Hungary and applied it to 
the change of employment number in each manufacturing sub-section. The previous 
chapter indicates that there was an increase in employment number in some of the 
sub-sections, while there was a decrease in others, and value added also changed in 
diff erent ways for the diff erent sub-sections.
The two eff ects mentioned above playing a role in the change of employment can 
be quantifi ed as follows. Let Lit, be the number of employees in any sub-section over 
a period, and Lit+1 in the next period (hereafter we apply the term “sector” to national 
Külg 3-4.indb   10 2016.12.06.   11:22:03
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manufacturing). The value added generated by a sub-section is Qit and Qit+1 in the 
two periods (in real terms). Based on these indicators we can determine the labor 
intensity in the two periods as Φ = L/Q (which indicator is the reciprocal of labor 
productivity2). Thus, for both periods L = Φ∙Q holds by defi nition. 
The change of employment number in a sub-section can be resolved as follows:
ΔLi = Φit + 1· Qit + 1 – Φit· Qit = (Φit + 1 – Φit)· ( Qit + 1+ Qit2 ) + (Qit + 1 – Qit) · ( Φit + 1+ Φit2 ) (1)
The fi rst term is the labor-intensity eff ect, and the second term is the sector-growth 
eff ect. From this the labor intensity-eff ect as a percentage change in employment for 
a given sub-section is:
 (Φit + 1 – Φit) · ( Qit + 1+ Qit2 ) · 100Lit   (2)
The labor-intensity eff ect shows by what percentage the number of employees 
in the sub-section should have changed solely as a result of the change in labor 
productivity in that sub-sector over the given period. If production becomes more 
effi  cient at the end of the period than it was at the beginning, then at the end of the 
period fewer workers are required to generate the same value added. In this case the 
labor-intensity eff ect will be negative, pointing toward a decrease in employment.
Similarly, the industry-growth eff ect as a percentage change in employment for 
a given sub-section is:




The industry-growth eff ect shows by what percentage the employment number 
should have changed over the given period in the sub-section solely based on the 
sub-section generating more (or less) value added in the subsequent period compared 
to the earlier one, with all other factors remaining unchanged. If the value added 
generated increased, then assuming constant labor productivity more employees are 
required to generate this higher value added. In this case the sector-growth eff ect 
2 We adopted the concept of labor intensity in our paper in Tregenna’s interpretation for 
comparability, even though the Hungarian literature uses this term in a diff erent sense. For the same 
reasons, in order for our line of thinking to harmonize with the internationally renowned author’s, 
instead of the intuitively more obvious labor productivity, we use labor intensity introduced as its 
“reverse indicator” in our analysis. 
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will be positive, pointing toward an increase in employment. The sum of the two 
eff ects gives the percentage change of the employment number in the industry. In our 
study, fi rst we describe the decomposition of national economy and manufacturing, 
and then we address the sub-sections.
The structural change of manufacturing
In the period of 2009–2014 in the whole national economy, employment 
increased to an appreciable extent (by 6.1%) as we presented in Table 1. This 
increase was combined with a slight improvement in labor productivity, which was 
greater than the employment decreasing eff ect of productivity growth (see: Table 2). 
Table 2
Decomposition of the performance of national economy and manufacturing









2009 3.04 6.54 –6.70 –18.08 –3.67 –11.54
2010 0.75 –11.00 0.80 10.00 1.55 –1.00
2011 –2.29 2.66 1.91 0.88 –0.38 3.53
2012 1.15 –0.45 –1.80 –1.49 –0.65 –1.94
2013 –1.53 2.68 2.50 –2.15 0.98 0.53
2014 0.75 –4.35 3.80 6.88 4.55 2.54
2008–
2014 1.92 –3.43 0.29 –4.93 2.22 –8.36
2009–
2014 –1.23 –10.72 7.33 14.32 6.10 3.60
Source: Authors’ collation from the dissemination database of the HCSO (downloaded: 12/15/2015).
The periods of 2008–2009 and 2011–2012 show diff erent type of decrease in 
employment number. While in the former case, the decrease in employment number 
took place with declining labor productivity, in the latter case value added increased, 
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but it was outweighed by the decrease in employment number due to improved labor 
productivity.
The lowest point of the crisis was the year 2009; the sector-growth eff ect shows 
a substantial decline in this year in both total economy and manufacturing. 2010 
and 2011 are clearly favorable in terms of the sector-growth eff ect. If we select 2009 
as the base year, and we study the change of employment number in the period of 
2009–2014, we can see an expansion in both national economy and manufacturing. 
Table 3
A possible categorization/typology of sub-sections 
Type 
number Marking Labor-intensity eff ect Sector-growth eff ect
% change of 
employment number
1  (…) – + +
2 * (…) + + +
3  (…) + – +
4 * (…) – + –
5  (…) – – –
6 * (…) + – –
Note: We will use the system in the “marking” column in Table 4. A sub-section falling into the fi rst 
category will be written on a white background with no asterisk. A sub-section falling into the second 
category will be written on white background, but marked with an asterisk, etc.
Source: Own construction.
The decline in employment in 2008–2009 was so substantial in manufacturing, 
that even by 2014 it could not recover to its 2008 level, whereas the total national 
economy could. It is interesting to observe that while the increase in employment 
number took place together with labor productivity growth and a simultaneous value 
added expansion in terms of both total economy and manufacturing, both eff ects 
were stronger in manufacturing, but the percentage increase in employment number 
generated as their resultant is still lower. Due to the signifi cant decline in both 
national economy and manufacturing from 2008 to 2009, we consider that we can 
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get a more accurate picture of the processes after the crisis if we take 2009 as the 
base year.
The labor-intensity eff ect, the sector (sub-section) growth eff ect and the 
percentage change of employment number can take positive or negative values. 
Overall, there are 6 mathematically possible combinations. If the key indicator of 
reindustrialization is that the number of employees is increasing, the following order 
seems most probable (1 – best case, 6 – worst case) (see: Table 3).
The most favorable case (1) is when employment number increases in a way 
that the value added of the given sub-section also increases, and at the same time 
it becomes more productive. The most unfavorable case (6) is when employment 
number decreases in the given sub-section in a way that, in addition to the shrinkage 
of the whole sub-section, even labor productivity decreases. In Table 2 we found that 
while 2009 falls into the worst (6th) category in the case of both national economy and 
manufacturing, the year 2010 can already be positioned into a better (the 4th) category 
for manufacturing even though the outcome is still a decrease in employment (as is 
the case in the year 2011 for the whole national economy).
Performing the decomposition and categorizing each manufacturing sub-
section based on Table 3, a diff erentiated picture emerges by sub-sections (see: 
Table 4). The marking (coloring with or without asterisk as in Table 3) of the cells 
indicates the industry growth and labor intensity eff ects explaining the percentage 
change in employment reported in the cells. The fi rst column of the table shows 
that during 2009, employment number decreased not only in national economy 
and manufacturing, but also in almost every manufacturing sub-section (except for 
CM: other manufacturing, and repair and installation of machinery and equipment), 
moreover, this mostly happened in a way that the shrinkage of the sub-section was 
accompanied by a decline in labor productivity. In subsequent years, (in particular 
in 2011 and 2014) the employment fi gure of many manufacturing sub-sections was 
rising, but as the second-to-last total column shows, the decline of 2009 generally 
could not be regained. The situation is better if we start out from 2009 as the base 
year: thus in the period of 2009–2014, 7 out of 13 sub-sections could achieve a lesser 
or greater increase in employment number. 
The percentage changes of employment in each manufacturing sub-section, which 
are given in Table 4, are received as the resultant of the industry-growth eff ect and 
the labor-intensity eff ect. Figure 4 now only presents the direction and percentage of 
the change of employment for the entire period of 2009–2014 explained by the sector 
growth-eff ect (on the vertical axis) and the labor-intensity eff ect (on the horizontal 
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axis) separately for each sub-section. Let us take the sub-section Manufacture of 
transport equipment (CL) as an example. The decomposition reveals that labor 
productivity improved in this sub-section, because of which employment should have 
decreased by 44.12% ceteris paribus. The real GVA produced by the sub-section, 
however, increased, which by itself should have increased the employment number 
by 73.64%. The fi rst is the labor-intensity eff ect, the second is the sector-growth 
eff ect. These two numbers as coordinates will locate sub-section CL in Figure 4, 
and the sum of these two numbers gives the 29.53% employment increase reported in 
Table 4 for this sub-sector CL, and will put this into category one in Table 3.
Employment increases in the case of the points above the line drawn from the 
upper left corner to the lower right corner of the fi gure and it decreases in the sub-
sections represented by points below the line. The portion of the second quadrant 
above this diagonal is the most favorable combination of a negative labor-intensity 
eff ect (increasing labor productivity) and the over-compensating industry-growth 
eff ect: sub-sections represented here are of the fi rst category in Table 3 (like sub-
section CL we used above as an example). In a clockwise direction from here 
we can fi nd sub-sections of the second category in the fi rst quadrant, then of the 
third category in the shaded part of the fourth quadrant. The white area below the 
diagonal in the second quadrant contains sub-sections of the fourth category, the 
third quadrant those of the fi fth and fi nally sub-sections of the sixth category will be 
found in the white area below the diagonal in the fourth quadrant (like, for example, 
Manufacture of wood and paper products, and printing (CC), where the number of 
employed decreased by 1.59% as a sum of a labor-intensity eff ect of 1.98 and a sector-
growth eff ect of –3.57).
We consider strengthening sub-sections (at least in terms of employment 
expansion) in the period of 2009–2014:
 – CK (Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.),
 – CL (Manufacture of transport equipment), 
 – CF (Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical 
products) and
 – CH (Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment) sub-sections.
Out of the sub-sections we identifi ed as strengthening, only CH and CL belong 
to the 1st category, the best in Table 3, and CK sub-section is included in category 2. 
We classifi ed CF sub-section from the 3rd category as a strengthening one because 
the increase in its employment number is close to the other sub-sections listed here.
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Figure 4
Change of employment explained by sector-growth eff ect and labor-intensity 
in each sub-section in the period of 2009–2014
(%)





























Note: Sub-section CD is not included in the fi gure due to its outlier values (its labor-intensity eff ect is 
165.5 and its sector-growth eff ect is –172.7). 
CA = Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products, CB = Manufacture of textiles, 
apparel, leather and related products, CC = Manufacture of wood and paper products, and printing, 
CD = Manufacture of coke and refi ned petroleum products, CE = Manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products, CF = Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products, 
CG = Manufacture of rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products, CH = 
Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment, CI = 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products, CJ = Manufacture of electrical equipment, 
CK = Manufacture of machinery and equipment, CL = Manufacture of transport equipment, CM = 
Other manufacturing, and repair and installation of machinery and equipment.
Source: Own calculations based on the dissemination database of the HCSO.
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These four sub-sections in total accounted for 32.4% of manufacturing 
employment and 42.9% of manufacturing value added in 2009 (in nominal terms), 
and these shares increased to 38.2% and 48.1% by 2014. In these strengthening 
sub-sections, labor productivity increased from 128.0% to 133.8% of average labor 
productivity in manufacturing.
In contrast with the growing ones, we termed weakening sub-sections the 
following:
 – CI (Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products),
 – CJ (Manufacture of electrical equipment),
 – CD (Manufacture of coke, and refi ned petroleum products) and
 – CB (Manufacture of textiles, apparel, leather and related products).
Each sub-section in this group has a common feature of decreasing employment. 
Out of these sub-sections, however, only one (CD) belongs to the worst (6th) category 
of Table 3, characterized by a negative sector-growth and a positive labor-intensity 
eff ect, the other three are included in the 4th category, where a negative labor-intensity 
eff ect prevails, over-compensating a positive sector-growth eff ect. 
The weakening sub-sections in total generated 22.5% of manufacturing value 
added by employing 24.7% of manufacturing employees in 2009, and these shares 
decreased to 20.4% and 18.7% by 2014. In these sub-sections productivity fl uctuated 
around 95.8% of average manufacturing productivity throughout the period.
The remaining 5 sub-sections we considered stagnating; these are characterized 
by an employment number that did not change substantially. The stagnating category 
includes a sub-section (CG, Manufacture of rubber and plastics products, and other 
non-metallic mineral products) where employment number increased and labor 
productivity improved, i.e., it can be categorized in the best (1st) category based 
on these two eff ects, but this growth is very small. At the same time, this group 
also contains CC (Manufacture of wood and paper products, and printing) sub-
section from the worst (6th) category, where along a negative sector-growth eff ect 
and declining labor productivity employment number decreased but again only to a 
small extent. 
In the case of the four strengthening sub-sections, there is a strong positive 
linear correlation between value added and the share in manufacturing gross value 
added (Pearson’s r coeffi  cient values: 0.87–0.94). In the weakening group, only 
one subsection (CB) is characterized by a negative, but only moderate correlation 
(–0.59). Based on this, it does appear that by the internal structural transformation 
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of manufacturing, the weight of sub-sections generating (in real terms) higher value 
added is increasing. 
Figure 5
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Note: The solid lines on the fi gure represent the share of employed in the given group of sub-sections 
within manufacturing, the dashed line represents the share of GVA produced by them and the dot-dash 
line is to show average productivity.
Source: Own construction based on the dissemination database of the HCSO.
We can also observe the changes in the four strengthening and the four 
weakening sub-sections by each year in terms of their share in manufacturing and 
the average productivity (see: Figure 5). Looking at the sub-sections with the highest 
increase in employment we fi nd that their share in GVA grows faster than their share 
in employment, so average labor productivity in these sub-sections exceeds the 
average of manufacturing. In Figure 5, the two dotted lines refer to the tendency 
of the average labor productivity compared to the manufacturing average, which 
is above 100% throughout the studied period, although a clear trend is not visible. 
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The solid lines compare the strengthening and weakening sub-sections in terms of 
employment number, while the dashed lines show their shares in GVA.
In our opinion, the increasing employment in manufacturing is more of a 
recovery to a former stage after a short-term halt, rather than reindustrialization. 
The value added of the national economy increased by 8% on average per year in the 
period of 2004–2008 at current prices, and only by 4.8% on average per year after 
the crisis, in the period of 2009–2014. Regarding the volume indices, we can also 
observe that the annual average increase of 3.3% in the pre-crisis years dropped by 
half in the years after the crisis. On the other hand, in manufacturing value added 
at current prices increased by 8.6% on average per year in the period of 2004–2008, 
and by only a slightly lower 8% after the crisis. The annual average increase of 
the volume index dropped by half in the post-crisis years from 6.4% of the period 
before the crisis, similarly to the tendency experienced in the total national economy. 
Consequently, value added in manufacturing increased faster than the value added 
of the total national economy in both the period before and after the crisis. The 
strengthening and weakening sub-sections are one of the signs of transformation and 
structural change in manufacturing.
Some background factors of the structural change of manufacturing
In manufacturing, we distinguished the strengthening and weakening sub-
sections, essentially based on one of the indicators of reindustrialization, the change 
in employment. We compare the two groups in terms of their export, investments, 
foreign direct investments and the change in the composition of employment. For the 
sake of completeness, we add the indicators of the remaining, so-called stagnating 
sub-sections, as well as their changes.
If we study how export-oriented the growth of each sub-section group is, we 
fi nd that in both the strengthening and the weakening sub-section groups the share 
of export sales within total sales increased. This share is higher for the strengthening 
group and the diff erence also increases (see: Table 5). While in the worst performing 
CH sub-section (Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment) of the strengthening group, the share of export sales 
within total sales is around 60% throughout, in the weakening group this share 
is below 34% for CD sub-section (Manufacture of coke and refi ned petroleum 
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products). It reveals even more if we look at the share of the two types of groups in 
total manufacturing export revenue: here the share of the fi rst group constantly rises 
(from 40.4% to 53.8%), while that of the second group falls rapidly (from 40.9% to 
24.2%). The two sub-section groups start from nearly the same value in 2009, but the 
share of the better performing sub-sections increased to more than double the share 
of the less well performing ones by 2014. The best performing CL (Manufacture of 
transport equipment) sub-section of the strengthening group has the greatest share in 
manufacturing export in total and its share constantly increases from 2009, while the 
best performing sub-section of the weakening group, CI (Manufacture of computer, 
electronic and optical products), which otherwise provides the second highest share 
of manufacturing export in total, keeps losing share. It becomes evident that the 
sub-sections termed strengthening are export-oriented. In the case of the third sub-
section group, the stagnating one, the share of export is low but growing (changed 
from 40.7% to 52.1%), i.e., the share of domestic sales is still quite high.
Table 5
Export performance indicators of the diff erent sub-section groups










































2008 66.7 79.5 39.3 76.0 43.5 17.1 39.4
2009 67.7 80.5 40.7 79.1 40.4 18.6 40.9
2010 70.2 84.0 43.8 78.2 42.2 18.2 39.6
2011 70.7 84.4 46.9 75.9 45.5 19.3 35.1
2012 70.8 85.3 48.9 74.1 48.0 21.3 30.7
2013 72.3 86.5 50.9 74.5 51.3 22.1 26.7
2014 73.4 86.5 52.1 75.7 53.8 21.8 24.4
Source: Own calculations based on the dissemination database of the HCSO.
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The value of investments in the total national economy at current prices changed 
from 4,950 billion HUF in 2008 to 5,200 billion HUF in 2014 (we used sub-section 
level investment data requested directly from HCSO). In the same period, investments 
in manufacturing started from about 1,140 billion HUF in 2008 and it constantly 
increased following the decrease in 2009, and it reached 1,530 billion HUF by 2014. 
The share of manufacturing within national economy investments increased from 
19.9% to 29.9% between 2009 and 2014.
Investment in the strengthening sub-sections shows an increase in nominal 
terms, while it more or less stagnates in the weakening ones. Accordingly, while the 
strengthening sub-sections concentrated only 37.2% of manufacturing investments 
in 2008, this share was already 53.6% by 2013 and 46.5% in 2014 (see: Table 6). 
Meanwhile, the share of the weakening sub-sections within total manufacturing 
investments decreased from 16.9% in 2008 to 12.3%. We can say that the strengthening 
sub-sections noticeably take an increasing part of total manufacturing investments; 
presumably this also contributes to their development and growth. The stagnating 
sub-sections group also made signifi cant investments, particularly in later years (its 
share within manufacturing is 41.2% in 2014).
Table 6
Investments in manufacturing and its sub-section groups, at current prices 










































2008 1135.8 422.4 521.3 192.0 37.2 45.9 16.9
2009 929.1 399.9 368.3 160.9 43.1 39.6 17.3
2010 995.0 440.8 377.6 176.6 44.3 37.9 17.8
2011 1286.8 678.5 427.2 181.2 52.7 33.2 14.1
2012 1369.4 817.8 379.7 171.9 59.7 27.7 12.5
2013 1366.4 731.8 476.8 157.7 53.6 34.9 11.5
2014 1530.1 712.1 630.6 187.4 46.5 41.2 12.3
Source: Own calculations based on HCSO data provision.
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Table 7
FDI of foreign controlled enterprises in manufacturing and its sub-section 
groups










































2008 5284.0 2847.2 1284.7 1152.1 53.9 24.3 21.8
2009 5718.4 3030.9 1380.3 1307.2 53.0 24.1 22.9
2010 6136.5 3103.8 1480.1 1552.6 50.6 24.1 25.3
2011 4327.4 1776.2 1521.3 1030.0 41.0 35.2 23.8
2012 4362.0 1670.5 1604.1 1087.4 38.3 36.8 24.9
2013 5051.5 2089.6 1840.6 1121.3 41.4 36.4 22.2
Note: BPM6 reporting groups together the sub-sections of CD (Manufacture of coke and refi ned 
petroleum products), CE (Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products) and CF (Manufacture of 
pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products), which belong to 3 diff erent groups in 
our classifi cation. We took the weights of the available BPM5 reporting as the basis for estimating each 
sub-section. We estimated the data of 2013, which is not included in BPM5, by assuming unchanged 
weights of 2012.
Source: HCSO STADAT 3.1.27.2 table.
The most current data on the evolution of the foreign direct investment of foreign 
controlled enterprises, composed based on BPM6 classifi cation, are available for 
the period of 2008–2013 based on the tables of HCSO STADAT. Over this period, 
the FDI of foreign controlled enterprises constantly increased in the total national 
economy. In manufacturing, however, there is a decline from 2010, with a recovery 
only in 2013, but even then it reached only 82% of the value in 2010. There is a large 
fl uctuation in nominal terms in the strengthening sub-sections, while the weakening 
sub-sections exhibit a much greater stability. The proportion of the latter group in 
manufacturing FDI broadly stagnates, but that of the former group decreases, for the 
benefi t of the stagnating sub-sections positioned between the two groups. In terms of 
shares, the 2.5-times advantage of the strengthening sub-sections at the beginning of 
the period was reduced to 1.9-times by the end of the period (see: Table 7). FDI per 
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employee is similar in all the three sub-section groups, between 7.4 and 91.1 million 
HUF/capita.
One of the stagnating sub-sections, CG (Manufacture of rubber and plastics 
products, and other non-metallic mineral products) stands out, as it has a substantial 
share in both the investments and the FDI of foreign controlled enterprises within 
manufacturing over the whole period. This sub-section accounted for 17.8% of total 
manufacturing investments in 2008, and 13.3% in 2014, while in this sub-section 
the FDI of foreign controlled enterprises accounted for 9.6% within manufacturing 
in 2008, and 16.2% in 2013. As we have previously demonstrated (see: Tables 1 and 
4), this sub-section shows a decline in employment, with an increase in demand 
unable to overcompensate the falling labor demand of the sub-section resulting from 
improving labor productivity. This capital-intensive sub-section generates 9.4% of 
GVA in manufacturing (this proportion is broadly unchanged in the studied period) 
with the help of 8.3% of manufacturing employment. 
Table 8
The number and proportion of non-manual employment in manufacturing and 
its sub-section groups
Number of non-manual employment 
(thousand people)


















































2008 152.4 53.4 61.6 37.4 22.2 22.9 22.3 21.3
2009 145.8 50.4 61.0 34.4 24.0 25.6 23.5 23.0
2010 143.0 50.9 58.9 33.2 23.8 25.6 22.9 23.0
2011 155.3 56.9 61.3 37.0 25.0 26.2 23.6 25.7
2012 154.4 58.3 60.1 36.0 25.3 26.5 23.8 26.2
2013 156.0 61.6 60.0 34.3 25.5 27.2 23.8 25.7
2014 159.3 64.7 61.8 32.7 25.4 27.0 23.8 25.6
Note: Non-manual and manual employment both include full-time and part-time employment.
Source:  Authors’ compilation from the dissemination database of the HCSO (downloaded: 09/04/2015).
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The transformation of manufacturing is also indicated by how the number 
of manual and non-manual employment and their proportion change in total 
manufacturing and in its sub-sections and sub-section groups (see: Table 8). 
Both in total manufacturing and in all the three subsection groups we identifi ed, 
the proportion of non-manual employment increased between 2008 and 2014, but 
increased in diff erent ways. In total manufacturing, the number of non-manual 
employment increased exceeding the expansion of manual employment, and the 
same applies to the strengthening sub-sections, only at a slightly higher level. In the 
stagnating sub-sections, non-manual employment number increased, while manual 
decreased in the studied period, and in the weakening sub-sections both non-manual 
and manual employment numbers decreased, but the latter did so to a greater extent. 
The strengthening sub-sections include CF (Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, 
medicinal chemical and botanical products) sub-section, which diff ers from the other 
3 sub-sections: the proportion of non-manual employment is high and increasing, 
61.2% of the total employment of 18 thousand in 2014, which is the highest proportion 
within domestic sub-sections. Only 22.2% of the 222 thousand employees in the 
other three growing sub-sections is non-manual, which proportion is below even the 
average in manufacturing. This means that a growing tendency is present in the sub-
sections employing mainly manual workers on a massive scale.
In terms of the proportion of non-manual employment, only one, CE (Manufacture 
of chemicals and chemical products) sub-section, stands out of the stagnating sub-
sections, where the small increase of non-manual employment number in the studied 
period is accompanied by a decline in the number of manual employment. Out of 
the total of 13.5 thousand employees, the proportion of non-manual employment 
increased from 39.8% in 2008 to 41.8% in 2014.
Conclusions
In our paper we analyzed the change of domestic manufacturing and its sub-
sections between 2008 and 2014 based on Tregenna’s method. The study revealed 
that a signifi cant structural change took place within manufacturing and based on 
the characteristics of change three sub-section groups can be distinguished. We 
identifi ed a group of sub-sections in which employment number increased and 
labor productivity improved in total and called them strengthening sub-sections 
[these are: Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (CK), Manufacture of 
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transport equipment (CL), Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical 
and botanical products (CF), and Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and equipment (CH)]. These sub-sections employ one 
third of manufacturing employees, 86% of their sales is export and 41% of the FDI 
of manufacturing foreign controlled enterprises is found here. Of the 4 sub-sections, 
the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products has 
an outstandingly high proportion of non-manual employment (it increased from 52% 
to 61% in the studied period). 
In the second group of sub-sections both employment number and GVA 
decreased, and productivity also lags behind the average in manufacturing. We 
called these sub-sections weakening [these are: Manufacture of computer, electronic 
and optical products (CI), Manufacture of electrical equipment (CJ), Manufacture 
of coke, and refi ned petroleum products (CD) and Manufacture of textiles, apparel, 
leather and related products (CB)]. This sub-section group is also export-oriented, 
75% of their sales is directed abroad. However, investments decrease and the amount 
of FDI stagnates. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that the proportion of non-
manuals within employment equals the average in manufacturing, with the values 
of CD highly above average (about 51%) and the values of CB highly below average 
(about 11%). The remaining sub-sections go to a group we called stagnating [there are 
5 of them, namely: Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products 
(CA), Manufacture of wood and paper products, and printing (CC), Manufacture of 
chemicals and chemical products (CE), Manufacture of rubber and plastics products, 
and other non-metallic mineral products (CG) and Other manufacturing, and repair 
and installation of machinery and equipment (CM)]. These are less export-oriented, 
half of their sales is directed at the domestic market, investments are moderate, while 
they took off  only in 2014 with the increase in FDI. 
Our analysis reveals that following the crisis of 2008 and the lowest point in 2009, 
there was no substantial reindustrialization until 2014. What is evident is a dynamic 
transformation within manufacturing, a signifi cant structural change among the sub-
sections. In this structural change, the export-oriented sub-sections have come into 
focus, besides the manufacture of pharmaceuticals which employs only relatively 
few people, the largest two out of the four machinery sub-sections, which employ 
manual workers predominantly and the role of FDI is of key importance.
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Chronicle of a Revolution Foretold in Hungary –
Industry 4.0 Technologies and manufacturing 
Subsidiaries
ANDREA SZALAVETZ
The paper discusses the impact of industry 4.0 technologies on the value chain 
position of production. Another purpose is to investigate the impact of these 
technologies on a sample of ten manufacturing subsidiaries in Hungary. We fi nd 
that the implementation of industry 4.0 technologies has neither led to the reshoring 
of production nor of activities that support production. Conversely, local production 
capacities have been upgraded: advanced manufacturing technologies deployed and 
integrated with existing systems. The new technologies have had a complex impact 
on skills: both de-skilling eff ects and skill-biased implications can be observed. 
Drawing on the empirical fi ndings and on the reviewed literature, two predictions 
are developed regarding the implications of industry 4.0 technologies. First, the 
share of value chain activities considered operative (non-core) will increase, and 
the number of activities global value chain orchestrators consider as strategic 
(core-competence) will decrease. Second, diff erences in the value chain position (or 
rather, in the position along the smile curve) of individual operative activities will 
become smaller: the bottom of the smile curve will be broader and fl atter.*
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) code: O33, O14, F23.
* The Hungarian version of the article was published in Külgazdaság, 2016, Vol. LX, No. 9–10, 
pp. 28–48 (Szalavetz Andrea: Egy előre bejelentett forradalom krónikája Magyarországon – Ipar 
4.0-technológiák és a hazai feldolgozóipari leányvállalatok).
Translated by Anna Forgács. Translation checked by Chris Swart.
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Manufacturing (processing and assembly) has long been considered a bottom-
of-the-smile-curve,1 operative activity within global companies. Manufacturing 
needs to be off shored or outsourced in order to minimise the related costs. Recently, 
however, some scholars (surveyed by Dombrowski et al., 2016) posited that with the 
advent of advanced manufacturing technologies,2 referred to as the fourth industrial 
revolution (henceforth industry 4.0), the value chain position of manufacturing 
might change: manufacturing might become a diff erentiating factor: a factor of 
competitiveness.
This statement needs to be scrutinised from the perspective of the competing 
defi nitions of industry 4.0. Most defi nitions lay emphasis on the technological 
aspects of the new era (Brettel et al., 2014),3 since the implementation of production 
systems that represent the new technologies is expected to produce an unprecedented 
improvement in the performance indicators4 of production (Rüβman et al., 2015).5
However, other scholars maintain that the defi nition of industry 4.0 should 
not be restricted to the technological novelties (Bharadwaj et al., 2013; Erol et al., 
2016; Kagermann et al., 2013). The real novelty of the industry 4.0 era is better 
captured by analyses that adopt an organisational or a business model approach. 
According to these approaches, the most important attribute of industry 4.0 is that 
the new technologies make it possible for the orchestrators of global value chains 
(GVC) to control the whole value chain in an unprecedentedly integrated manner 
1 The diff erences in the value added of individual activities comprising the value chain were 
illustrated by a smile-shaped curve in Mudambi [2008] (see fi gure 1a later in the text). According to 
Mudambi’s model, the value added of activities that precede production (e.g. elaboration of the business 
concept, creation/coordination of the supply chain, basic and applied research, design), and the value 
added of post-production activities (e.g. marketing, product related services provision, sales, after-sales 
services provision) are much higher than the value added of the ones represented in the middle of the 
curve (processing, assembly).
2 Advanced manufacturing technologies include among others cyber-physical systems, big data, 
artifi cial intelligence, collaborative industrial robots, 3D printing – see Szalavetz [2016].
3 In the conceptual paper that introduced this empirical one (Szalavetz, 2016) I also used a 
technological defi nition drawing on Monostori [2015]: “…production takes place in smart factories, 
in other words, cyber-physical production systems are implemented. New technologies (for instance: 
nanotechnology, laser technology, industrial biotechnology, 3D printing, artifi cial intelligence) and 
new materials are used, and these latter have better physical features than the prior ones.”
4 For example, in the capacity utilisation rate, in the accuracy of processing, and in other qualitative 
operational performance indicators, such as lead-time and fl exibility, and in costs.
5 The title of this paper is paraphrasing Gabriel García Márquez’s novel, suggesting that contrary 
to the other industrial revolutions that were identifi ed as such ex-post (Freeman–Louçã, 2001), the 
fourth industrial revolution was foretold (for example Bermann, 2012; Kagermann et al., 2013; Manyika 
et al., 2013). This leaves the still undecided debate open, whether the experienced changes are in fact 
revolutionary or only incremental. 
Külg 3-4.indb   30 2016.12.06.   11:22:04
31
Chronicle of a Revolution Foretold in Hungary 
– provided that they adapt their organisational structure to the requirements of the 
new technologies.6 The coordinators of GVCs will be able to monitor and further 
develop their products throughout the whole life cycle (Erol et al., 2016; see also 
Porter–Heppelmann, 2014, 2015) and they will gain competitive advantages from 
business model innovations. 
In brief, according to this latter perspective, the revolutionary aspect of 
industry 4.0 is not the enhanced production capability originating from the digital 
transformation of manufacturing, but rather the competitive advantage originating 
from the digital transformation of business as a whole (including the business model).
These competing defi nitions constitute the point of departure of this paper. We 
investigate Dombrowski et al.’s [2016] cited prediction about the changing value 
chain position of manufacturing from the specifi c perspective of manufacturing 
subsidiaries in “factory economies” (Baldwin, 2012).
If the fourth industrial revolution really makes production activity a factor 
of competitiveness, in other words: if industry 4.0 is not only about a temporary 
competitive advantage gained from the costly modernisation of the production 
system, but production itself moves upwards from the bottom of the smile curve, then 
the factory economies that are able to keep the production activities that had been 
off shored to them, and preserve also the related advanced support activities, i.e. their 
prior upgrading achievements – will have uniquely favourable prospects.
If however, industry 4.0 also transforms headquarter functions (i.e. besides 
producing really spectacular improvements in the performance indicators of 
production, industry 4.0 is rather mainly about the digital transformation of business), 
then a conclusion about eventual changes in the relative value chain position of 
manufacturing can be drawn only by examining, in parallel, the moves along the 
smile curve of all business functions and activities that comprise the value chain.
Drawing on an overview of the literature and on interviews with local 
manufacturing subsidiaries, this paper aims at uncovering the impact of industry 4.0 
6 There is a related, rapidly expanding literature that addresses the organisational consequences 
of digital transformation. More specifi cally, this stream in the literature is concerned with the specifi cs 
of the organisational changes that are considered necessary to make corporate organisations aligned 
with the requirements of the digital era. It is investigated, for example, how organisational silos 
could be bridged, across-silo collaboration and cross-functional business strategy implemented. How 
should the IT function be redesigned so that it becomes integrated with (rather than subordinated to) 
other business processes: how should a digital business strategy designed and corporate organisation 
transformed accordingly? – See for example: Agarwal–Brem [2015]; Bharadwaj et al. [2013]; Porter–
Heppelmann [2015].
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technologies on the value chain position of production, and on the upgrading of the 
surveyed manufacturing subsidiaries.
Corporate interviews can, evidently, provide no clear and direct answer to 
the former question. Moreover, we cannot even claim that the interviews provide 
solid answers to all the questions raised in the theoretical paper (Szalavetz, 2016) 
introducing this research. For instance, nowhere near enough time has passed to 
clearly state that the reshoring of production activities to home countries has not 
happened.
Consequently, the results of interviews about the diff usion of, and the fi rst 
experiences with industry 4.0 technologies permit only hypothesis development 
and conceptual analysis of Dombrowski et al.’s [2016] prognosis that technological 
progress will prompt changes in the relative value chain position of production. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. This introduction will be 
followed by a brief overview of the related literature. Next, the research method will 
be presented and the sample of the surveyed companies introduced. Following the 
presentation of the results, the paper concludes with a conceptual analysis and with 
hypotheses about the eventual changes in the value chain position of production.
Theoretical background
The topic of technological revolutions can be associated with virtually all strands 
of (international) economics and business. The theories that are the most relevant for 
this research address the factors that determine the diff usion of new technologies 
and the impact of technological development on the structure of employment and 
on the skill-set required by employers.7 Furthermore, the literature discussing 
the tertiarisation of manufacturing, i.e. the integration of production and service 
activities, and the global value chain literature, more specifi cally, the stream that 
focuses on subsidiary upgrading versus the charter loss of local subsidiaries, and 
fi nally, the literature that investigates the attributes of industry 4.0 technologies and 
their impact on business are also closely connected to the question at hand.
Here, we will only highlight some conclusions from the above-mentioned 
directions of the literature.
7 This latter topic was discussed in my previous theoretical paper (Szalavetz, 2016).
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An important fi nding of the literature discussing the diff usion of new technologies 
is that this process has considerably accelerated over the past century (Comin–
Hobijn, 2010). Accelerating globalisation is the key explanatory factor of enhanced 
technology diff usion, since international trade and foreign direct investment are not 
only the main drivers of globalisation, but also important channels of technology 
diff usion (Eaton–Kortum, 2001; Keller, 2004). Nevertheless, technology diff usion 
is not automatic: successful technology absorption requires indigenous technology 
development eff orts by the recipients (Cohen–Levinthal, 1990; Fu et al., 2011). 
Altogether, the lag with which new technologies are adopted across countries 
is seemingly diminishing: new technologies are adopted increasingly rapidly 
also in peripheral economies, far from the countries where innovative activity is 
concentrated.8 If however, the intensive margin of technology adoption is examined, 
cross-country diff erences are much larger. Comin–Mestieri [2013] showed that even 
though cross-country diff erences in adoption lags (extensive margin of technology 
diff usion) have spectacularly diminished, if the penetration rate of new technology 
(intensive margin) is examined, i.e. the share of economic actors that have adopted 
the new technologies and the intensity of technology use, cross-country diff erences 
have rather widened in the 20th century. According to the cited authors, cross-country 
diff erences in the intensive margin of technology adoption account for a large share 
of the diff erences in countries’ income levels.
The title of Comin–Mestieri's paper [2013] (If technology has arrived 
everywhere, why has income diverged?) recalls a classical theoretical thesis, the 
theory of appropriate technology selection (Basu–Weil, 1998). According to this 
theory, countries’ selection among competing technologies is determined by their 
relative factor endowments.
These theoretical arguments are particularly interesting for our topic. In our case 
the question arises: what is the time lag in middle-income factory economies, of 
adopting the most advanced manufacturing technologies? Frontier technology may 
not be appropriate for the current factor proportions and especially at the current 
level of human capital stock in these countries. If technology is not appropriate, 
nevertheless it is widely used in selected segments of the economy that are 
characterised by a high share of foreign equity, what explains foreign investors’ 
technology transfer? 
8 Technology generation is, however, still very much concentrated in a couple of advanced 
economies (Eaton–Kortum, 2001), and it is still true that few countries can eff ectively approach the 
world technology frontier (Eichengreen et al., 2013). 
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Another topic that is closely related to our research is the integration of 
manufacturing and service activities (the servitization of manufacturing). It is not 
a new phenomenon: it can be observed both at the input and the output side9 for a 
long time (Pilat–Wölff , 2005; Szabó, 2006; Tomlinson, 2000; Vandermerwe–Rada, 
1988). Nowadays the servitization of manufacturing is accelerating: “products” that 
used to be the basic unit of output in manufacturing fi rms have long been replaced 
by “bundles of products and services”, “product–service systems”, or “integrated 
solutions”. In the industry 4.0 era (in certain industries) a new term signalises the 
strengthening of the servitization trend: the emergence of the business model of a 
“product-as-a-service”. In this model, a sales transaction does not cover the ownership 
of the product, thus the buyer pays only for the functionality of the product.10 In other 
words, the product is the platform of the related services.11
On the input side, one of the key technological novelties that refl ect the 
unprecedented development of IT supporting and controlling manufacturing is 
that smart production systems can take autonomous decisions (without human 
intervention). Manufacturing activity is controlled by adaptive, self-organising and 
self-optimising systems that are also capable of self-learning due to inbuilt artifi cial 
intelligence (Váncza et al., 2011). Another, less frequently mentioned but just as 
signifi cant novelty is that ubiquitous information technology has radically increased 
the integration and transparency of activities along the value chain, thus the 
coordination and control of value chains have become easier. These latter activities 
are typically headquarter functions, similarly to systems integration. Applications 
supporting business decisions – another corporate centre function – have also 
rapidly spread. This is an important new development in an age, when the costs 
9 Manufacturing uses more and more services and a greater variety of services are integrated in, 
or accompany and add value to products.
10 For example, it is not the price of the product the customer pays, he/she pays (a predetermined 
fee) rather for the improvement of the performance indicators (effi  ciency increase, cost reduction) that 
occur as a result of implementing the given solution (Iansiti–Lakhani, 2014; Lacy–Rutqvist, 2015). 
Similarly, sales transaction is not about ownership transfer, if customers purchase cloud-based IT 
services. These services exempt customers from investing in (the ownership of) high-performance 
servers and data centres. The most famous example of product-as-a-service is the performance-based 
pricing of the air-plane engine of Rolls-Royce (“power by the hour”, i.e. based on the hours fl own).
11 The term platform refers, on one hand, to the possibility of product lifecycle management and 
incremental development using product embedded information technology. On the other hand, it refers 
to the phenomenon that not the product itself is valuable for the buyer but the related services, for 
example the data extraction and business analytical solutions embedded in the production equipment 
(Porter–Heppelmann, 2015).
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of integration and coordination have increased for decades due to the increasing 
complexity of the value chains (see: Larsen et al., 2013 for an overview).12
Lastly, another line of the literature worth mentioning here addresses the evolution 
of subsidiary mandates, and analyses the factors that infl uence this evolution. The 
relevant literature abounds in case studies about subsidiary learning and about the 
upgrading of “entrepreneurial subsidiaries” (Birkinshaw, 1996, Birkinshaw–Hood, 
1998; Contractor et al., 2010; Manning et al., 2008). These papers demonstrate that it 
is possible to extend the range of locally performed business functions and activities. 
They underscore that the division of labour within the global company is not rigid: 
manufacturing subsidiaries can gain responsibility for advanced, sophisticated tasks 
that are more knowledge-intensive than their previous responsibilities and generate 
higher value added.
The changes, however, are not one-way: the extension of responsibilities can be 
followed by the loss of certain mandates. Changes in the external environment, for 
example 
 – a downturn in the business cycle, which prompts parent companies to 
consolidate the value chain; 
 – if a competitor acquires the parent company;
 – if the parent company decides to change its business model; 
or if – and this is the most relevant for our topic:
 – new technologies emerge that represent a radical change compared to the 
previous technological paradigm – may provoke fundamental changes in the 
functional division of labour within the global company (Cano-Kollman et 
al., 2016; Dörrenbächer–Gammelgaard, 2010; Gereffi  , 2014).
Research method and corporate sample
Since the research questions – fi rms’ fi rst experiences with industry 4.0 
technologies – require qualitative investigation, an interview-based method seemed 
12 In a previous study (Szalavetz, 2013), I referred to the services that contribute to the integration 
and coordination of geographically dispersed value adding activities, as value chain integration 
services. These services are on the input side of manufacturing activities, and include corporate- 
and value chain-specifi c IT and logistics services, services related to supply chain development, 
organisation development, technical support for subsidiaries, etc.). These services represent a new, 
third category, in addition to (a) the services that support the core activity (logistics, human resource 
development, R&D and design, testing, etc.) and (b) product embedded services. 
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a suitable approach. Selecting the sample of companies to be interviewed, my point 
of departure was Comin–Mestieri’s [2013] cited fi nding, that there are signifi cant 
cross-country diff erences in the penetration rate of new technologies (in the intensive 
margin of technology diff usion). In Hungary, for example, the situation is not very 
positive: according to the Digital Economy & Society Index (DESI, 2016) of the 
European Commission, Hungary ranks twentieth out of the EU-28 Member States 
in terms of digital performance. One of the DESI Index dimensions Hungary scores 
worst on – much below the EU-average – is the “Integration of Digital Technology 
by Business”.
In light of these statements, it seemed appropriate to look for local manufacturing 
subsidiaries of global companies to be interviewed: they are the ones that account 
for the diff usion of advanced manufacturing technologies in Hungary. I focused on 
industries where industry 4.0 technologies are the most relevant and widespread: 
automotive industry, electronics and machinery industry (PWC, 2014).13 I selected 
information-rich cases, referred to by Patton [1990] as a purposeful sampling method. 
The cases of the companies in the sample are unique, they cannot be generalised, 
but their experiences promise insightful observations about issues related to this 
research. 
The interviewed companies have been selected from two databases: the articles 
and case studies published either in the journal called Techmonitor and the related 
website (see: http://techstorym2m.hu), or in the journal called Gyártástrend. The 
managers interviewed were asked to answer open-ended questions based on a 
previously composed interview protocol. The written questions were led up by 
questions constructed on the basis of the Techmonitor/Gyártástrend case study of 
the given company, and by other company-specifi c questions, related to information 
gained from the given company’s notes to the fi nancial statement or from its website.
The fi rst group of questions inquired about the industry 4.0 solutions implemented 
by the given companies; the level of production automation; the specifi cs of their 
recent technological investments; and the key novelty of the new technologies – as 
perceived by the managers interviewed. The next group of questions investigated 
the drivers and motivations of industry 4.0 technology implementation. Lastly, I 
inquired about the impact of new technological solutions on employment and on 
the nature of work, on corporate performance indicators and on the position of the 
given subsidiary within the global company. I asked, whether the implementation of 
13 According to the cited PWC study, the pharmaceutical and chemical industries are also among 
the intensive users of industry 4.0 technologies.
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the new technologies prompted any changes in the responsibilities of the subsidiary, 
whether there was an example of a prior upgrading achievement that had vanished 
as a consequence of industry 4.0 technology adoption (if yes, what specifi cally?), 
or, conversely, whether the new technological solutions have rather opened up new 
opportunities for upgrading.
As the investigation was anonymous, only a couple of aggregate data will be 
provided about the composition of the sample. Interviews were made with ten 
manufacturing subsidiaries in the automotive (n = 5) and electronics industries (n 
= 4), and with a local machinery subsidiary of a global multi-divisional company. 
The companies interviewed are large: with an average number of employees of 1,239 
in 2015, and average turnover: € 305 million (n = 9). They are export-oriented: 96 
per cent of the turnover comes from export (n = 9). All the companies have been 
operating in Hungary for a long time, on average for twenty-one years in 2016.
Results
Industry 4.0 technologies at the subsidiaries in the sample
The experience of the companies in the sample provides convincing evidence 
that local subsidiaries are the main drivers of the diff usion of new manufacturing 
technologies in Hungary. The cases of the surveyed companies, and other cases 
in the two databases demonstrate a rapid diff usion of industry 4.0 technologies 
in Hungary, and also an intensive use of these technologies. This overall positive 
picture is, however, partly due to a biased sample selection. 
The surveyed companies are not only intensive users (and early adopters) of 
industrial automation solutions, RFID technologies, cyber-physical systems and 
intelligent decision support systems. They are, to some extent, also producers of 
the technology, as local experts participate in the customisation and in the related 
adaptive development of the cyber-physical production systems. Subsidiary 
engineers take part in the programming of industrial robots and in some cases they 
also undertake corporate-level software development tasks.
Nevertheless, the interviews have also made it clear that the observed speed 
and scope of technology diff usion and intensity of use cannot be solely explained 
by a biased sample selection. The managers interviewed called attention to two 
additional factors. The fi rst one is the gradual and cumulative nature of industry 4.0 
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implementation. Switching to industry 4.0 is a long process, there is no such thing 
as one single investment decision for “transition to industry 4.0”. A key principle 
applied when designing the new technological solutions was that they should be 
compatible with the existing production systems, so that the functionality of existing 
systems should not be endangered by the automation and digitalisation of selected 
processes, and by the deployment of industrial robots, sensors, data extraction 
solutions and smart algorithms that control production. This makes the integration 
of new technologies in the production system easier and cheaper: there is no need 
to implement large-scale greenfi eld investments. Note, however, that the most 
comprehensive industry 4.0 systems (pilot applications) have been implemented at 
new greenfi eld facilities built to expand production at some companies in the sample.
The compatibility of industry 4.0 technologies with legacy systems is favourable 
for Hungary, as a factory economy. If existing production facilities can be developed 
gradually by integrating new technological solutions into the existing systems, parent 
companies would not necessarily consider the issue of location (whether to reshore 
production): this question would immediately arise if the deployment of industry 4.0 
technologies required large-scale greenfi eld investments.
Another issue emphasised during the interviews was that the technological 
solutions labelled as industry 4.0 are in fact not that radically new as business 
press articles on the subject suggest. In the automotive industry, the traceability of 
the products, product parts, and of all components of the production process has 
long been a standard rule.14 Computer-operated production equipment, connected 
machines, simulations used for process development, virtual product design and 
development cannot be regarded unprecedented novelties either.
Nevertheless, it is new that the price of industrial robots has signifi cantly 
decreased, which promises good return on investment even in low-wage locations. 
Another novelty is the emergence of collaborative industrial robots (contrary to 
conventional robotic applications where robots are fenced, i.e. completely separated 
from human workers, collaborative robots are not locked away but share a common 
work space with human operators). According to some interviewees, collaborative 
robots are expected to signifi cantly reduce the number of jobs on the shop fl oor (in 
certain physical activities).
The real novelty of industry 4.0 technologies is, however, the enormous amount 
of data that can be extracted about various parameters of the production process, 
14 Producers have long been using track and trace systems to be able to identify and locate 
potentially faulty items in the supply chain that could pose a hazard to consumers.
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as this has radically transformed: enhanced and optimised a number of business 
functions, including quality control, production scheduling, maintenance of the 
production equipment, logistics, etc. As for quality control, for example, nowadays 
there is no need to pick product samples and inspect their quality parameters to 
uncover potential defects. There is no need to examine defected products and try to 
fi nd the causal relation between defects and eventual defi ciencies in the production 
process. Data are collected about every single product, every processing step, and 
about the condition (e.g. the potential degradation) of the machines and tools involved 
in the production process. These data are processed by the computing algorithms 
that are integrated in the cyber-physical production system. Big data analysis has 
produced qualitative changes: it has become easier to understand the root causes of 
production problems and provide rapid feedback.
Another novelty is the unprecedented computerised integration of production 
(i.e. of heterogeneous production equipment controlled by a variety of software 
applications): this has made the production process much more transparent than 
previously.
Altogether, the surprisingly intensive use (among the interviewed companies) of 
industry 4.0 technologies can be explained by the fact that “industry 4.0” builds on 
already existing solutions, it improves, unifi es and supplements them, and (in some 
fi elds) it brings them to the next level.
A third explanation of the rapid extensive and intensive diff usion of industry 
4.0 technologies needs to be mentioned, beyond the ones told during the interviews. 
Digitalising production is much easier, faster and cheaper than digitalising business 
(shifting to a digital business model, i.e. transforming the framework of competition). 
It could even be claimed that it is easier, faster and cheaper to transform production 
units in “factory economies” into industry 4.0 pilot applications (at least in the 
case of actors that operate in segments that had been modernised by foreign direct 
investment and are characterised by a high share of foreign equity) than to transform 
the companies in “headquarter economies” so that they fulfi l the requirements of the 
digital age: introduce new work models, new organisational structures and transform 
their business models (see the case studies by Agarwal–Brem, 2015 and Iansiti–
Lakhani, 2014 about the transformation of GE, and Burmeister et al., 2015; Porter–
Heppelmann, 2014, 2015 on digital transformation).
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Motivations regarding the adoption of industry 4.0 technologies
According to the corporate interviews, when investing in industry 4.0 
technologies, in most cases, the surveyed companies did not act according to a 
predetermined “digital strategy”. The purpose of investments was rather to fi nd a 
solution to a specifi c technological problem. Examples include system malfunctions, 
machine failures, unplanned shut-downs, poor cycle times, earlier-than-expected 
tool wear and a shorter than expected lifespan of tools, excessive number of product 
defects, long changeover time, poor process stability, ineffi  cient process scheduling 
and bottlenecks in production.
Some managers emphasised other (non-technological) factors, namely that the 
new requirements set up by customers in terms of quality, deadline and fl exibility 
were so high that they could be fulfi lled only by radically transforming the production 
system and introducing digital solutions, e.g. a real-time control of the production 
process.
Others mentioned the increasing complexity of production as a key motivation 
for introducing industry 4.0 solutions. The rapid expansion and diversifi cation 
of production reduced the transparency of the system, which provoked multiple 
problems. In order to prevent the accumulation of problems, the implementation 
of IT solutions (big data analysis, optimisation of multiple parameters, capacity 
planning and production scheduling software) proved indispensable.
One of the companies gave a surprising answer to the lack of adequately trained 
workforce, which is a common problem across the sample. According to the chief 
executive offi  cer interviewed, it was mainly the shortage of labour that motivated the 
deployment of collaborative robots. Another reason was the signifi cantly reduced 
price of this new generation of industrial robots, which promised unprecedentedly 
favourable returns on investment. Conversely, other managers interviewed 
maintained that hiring additional workers is still more cost-eff ective than automating 
production.15 New technologies have been introduced not to replace workers, or 
solve the problem of labour shortage, but rather to enhance workers’ capabilities. 
The referred solutions reduce the expensive training period of new operators 
and minimise the possibility of human error. One example is the introduction of 
advanced process control solutions, a digital supervisory and information provision 
15 This is obviously a function of technology: the cost eff ectiveness of automation depends on the 
features of the given activity and on the possibility/ease of labour replacement by robots. 
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system that support operators’ compliance with the technical specifi cations of the 
manufacturing process.16
Two other generally mentioned objectives, which the surveyed fi rms tried to 
achieve by implementing industry 4.0 solutions are operational excellence and 
productivity increase. As one interviewee noted: “The implementation of automated 
optical inspection technology and production planning software will boost 
our productivity to reach 95 per cent of the respective indicator of our owner’s 
manufacturing subsidiary in Germany.” 
It is worth noting that the objective of reducing costs was never mentioned 
explicitly. Even if unit labour costs decreased17 as a result of technology adoption, the 
purpose of investing companies was not the reduction of costs, rather the increase in 
cost effi  ciency. As the main positive impacts of cyber-physical systems are manifested 
in adopting fi rms’ improved resource effi  ciency and optimised production, the goal 
of enhancing cost effi  ciency was achieved by the surveyed companies.
The eff ect of industry 4.0 technologies on employment and on the upgrading of the 
Hungarian subsidiaries
The interviews have made it clear that although industrial automation solutions 
indeed reduce the unit labour input of production, industry 4.0 technologies are 
not about saving labour, but rather about achieving operational excellence. When 
investigating the impact of the new technologies on employment, it should not be 
forgotten that advanced manufacturing technologies transform the activities of 
engineers as well. For example, some activities that are based on engineers’ routine 
and on their prior experiences will be automated, including production organisation, 
production planning and scheduling, capacity planning, maintenance scheduling.
The fi ndings of the literature on the eff ects of industry 4.0 technologies on the 
nature of work and on the labour market (discussing whether the recent technological 
progress is skill-biased or just the contrary) are quite ambiguous. Corporate 
experiences were a good illustration of this ambiguity.
16 Another example is the use of augmented reality glasses that provide process instructions. The 
companies in the sample have not introduced this technology yet, though some managers interviewed 
mentioned this technology as one that may be introduced in the future to enhance physical operators’ 
capabilities.
17 As a result of production expansion and the relocation of new tasks to Hungary, the number 
of employees has rapidly increased at the surveyed companies over the past couple of years (average 
employment increased by 20 per cent between 2012 and 2015). Consequently, the labour-saving eff ects 
of industry 4.0 technologies can be observed only in relative terms. 
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The experience of the surveyed companies illustrated, for example, that 
new technologies will increase demand for a workforce capable of carrying out 
knowledge-intensive, complex tasks (Acemoglu–Restrepo, 2015; Autor, 2015). As 
one of my interviewees stated: “Daily production reports are not prepared for 
the management (for general or production managers, or process development 
engineers) any more, they are rather used by the operators.”
The fi rst experiences of the companies in the sample also confi rm that new 
technologies will make some components of skilled employees’ knowledge 
redundant. In other words, what most authors maintain, namely that automation will 
aff ect not only low-skilled, physical activities, but some routine knowledge work will 
also be automated, and smart algorithms will take over selected knowledge-intensive 
activities as well (Chui et al., 2015; Frey–Osborne, 2013)18 – was confi rmed. One 
example is production scheduling that used to be carried out based on production 
engineers’ routine and accumulated experience. Another skill that has become 
obsolete is the ability to prepare summary production reports based on the analysis 
of daily production data. Smart algorithms have taken these, relatively high-skilled 
activities over.
In other cases, smart systems have not taken the given activity over, but have 
signifi cantly simplifi ed the related knowledge work. The analysis of production data 
has become easier: smart algorithms prepare the primary evaluation of massive 
amounts of production data. These algorithms identify “nodes” and “patterns” which 
should be observed and considered when planning production and capacities, and 
when taking maintenance scheduling decisions. 
3D visualisation techniques have enhanced new product design. The virtual 
representation of the production system has enhanced operational transparency 
and simplifi ed production control. Process supervisory techniques combined with 
advanced visualisation solutions facilitated blue-collar employees’ compliance with 
the technical specifi cations of the assembly process. The fl ipside of the coin was an 
overall improvement in process discipline and a reduction in the defect rate.
Examined from another angle, industry 4.0 technologies can be considered skill-
biased, since their operation and maintenance requires employees’ absorption and 
mastering of these technologies. According to one informant, one engineer was fi red 
18 A related thesis in the literature is that the labour market will be increasingly polarised with 
demand remaining signifi cant for low-skilled, standard activities. At the same time, medium-level 
routine activities will gradually disappear, and demand for outstanding expertise and qualifi cations 
will strongly increase (Acemoglu–Autor, 2011; Degryse, 2016; Hirsch-Kreinsen–ten Hompel, 2015).
Külg 3-4.indb   42 2016.12.06.   11:22:05
43
Chronicle of a Revolution Foretold in Hungary 
for being unable to make the necessary transition from experience- and routine-
based production scheduling to a task execution determined by the results of the 
newly implemented computing algorithms. 
As for the relation between industry 4.0 technology deployment and the upgrading/
downgrading of the local subsidiaries, the interviews produced ambiguous results. 
There were no examples for the loss of subsidiary mandates or for the reshoring of 
activities to the host country. Just the contrary: there were abundant examples of the 
location of additional production activities to Hungary. Nevertheless, according to 
the interviewed managers, the causal link between new technology deployment and 
further relocations to Hungary is not obvious. According to a consensus fi nding of 
several managers interviewed, “new relocations to Hungary have been going on 
for years. Similarly, production technology is being developed continuously. The 
adoption of industry 4.0 technologies is, in this sense, ‘business as usual’: part of 
the ongoing organic development process.”
Elsewhere, the expansion of production required the construction of a new, 
greenfi eld facility. Consequently, it seemed evident that the new facility should 
be equipped with the most up-to-date technological solutions. In some instances, 
the management of the Hungarian subsidiary initiated – using the budget available 
for the subsidiary to use autonomously for investment, or using the amount of 
government support awarded in the framework of policy programmes supporting 
companies’ technology development initiatives – that cyber-physical solutions 
should be implemented to optimise certain parameters of the production process. 
Other examples of subsidiary-driven investment included the digitalisation of 
certain manufacturing processes and their connection to the network, and the 
implementation of business analytics software that permitted the local processing 
and analysis of locally collected production-related big data.
In some instances, the local subsidiary proposed certain investments at a 
multinational company-level brainstorming on the application possibilities of 
industry 4.0, and the given technological solutions have been adopted.
In other cases the parent company standardised and unifi ed its production system 
within the global network, and in doing so, the best practices were implemented by 
each manufacturing subsidiary.
All in all, however, the managers interviewed did not see a causal link 
between the adoption of industry 4.0 technologies and subsidiary upgrading. At 
most, as some have mentioned, openness towards the implementation of the new 
technological solutions gives an opportunity for the Hungarian subsidiary to pioneer 
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the introduction of these applications and to become the “pilot project” and the “best 
practice” that is adopted later elsewhere.
Following the presentation of the results of the interviews, we now return to the 
questions raised in the introduction, about the impact of industry 4.0 technologies 
on the value chain position of production in general, and on the upgrading of the 
surveyed manufacturing subsidiaries, in particular.
Discussion and conclusions
The rapid adoption and intensive use of industry 4.0 technologies, at least in a 
well-delineated segment of the Hungarian corporate ecosystem, is only seemingly 
surprising. The surveyed cases of technology diff usion and use are not intended to 
suggest that the theory of appropriate technology selection needs to be refuted as 
outdated. Neither do they suggest that the current factor endowments and factor 
proportions would generally necessitate frontier technology in Hungary.
Instead, the surveyed cases rather serve as an illustration to a new phenomenon, 
described by Baldwin [2014] and by Whittaker et al. [2010]. Once integrated in 
global value chains through foreign direct investment, economic actors do not 
need to go through all stages of organic development, i.e. of capital and knowledge 
accumulation. The fast lane of foreign direct investments can make them leapfrog to 
the technological frontier, at least in terms of production capabilities.
A related argument is provided in Kravtsova–Radosevic [2012]. These authors 
have presented convincing evidence that the spectacular modernisation driven 
by foreign direct investment has been confi ned to the production capabilities of 
economic actors in Central and Eastern Europe. The technological (innovation) 
capabilities of these actors have, however, hardly improved.
Another issue to be considered when evaluating the results of our research is that 
these cases represent anecdotal evidence (a couple of pilot projects). The intensive 
margin of technology adoption is still very low as demonstrated by the poor scores 
of the Digital Economy & Society Index (DESI, 2016).
Nevertheless, the specifi c eff ects of industry 4.0 technologies on the surveyed 
local subsidiaries only seemingly confi rm Kravtsova–Radosevic’s [2012] cited 
argument. Advanced manufacturing technologies have, indeed, uniquely positive 
eff ects on adopting actors’ production capabilities: the cost effi  ciency, accuracy 
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and reliability of processes improve, resource utilisation becomes optimised, and 
companies approach operational excellence. 
Still, the arguments of Tassey [2014] are also confi rmed, namely that in the 
industry 4.0 era production capabilities and technological capabilities are becoming 
more strongly integrated than ever. This is demonstrated by the fact that the surveyed 
subsidiaries are not only users of industry 4.0 technologies, but subsidiary experts 
participate in the customisation and adaptive development of the given solutions, and 
also in several partial supplementary development tasks. There is a bigger need for the 
experiences and the expertise of subsidiary engineers than ever before with respect 
to the manufacturability of new product design, and/or in the deployment, operation 
and further development of industry 4.0 technologies, and in the development of the 
manufacturing processes.
This line of arguments takes us back to the theoretical question raised in the 
introduction: Can the revolutionary manufacturing technologies change the position 
of manufacturing within the global value chain? Can it be expected that production 
will move upwards from the bottom of the smile curve?
The point of departure of our analysis is that due to the specifi cs of the new 
technologies, the activities that comprise the value chain have become more strongly 
integrated than ever. Consequently, production has also become more interwoven 
with development than previously. The number of development tasks that need 
to be co-located with production has multiplied, though virtual reality-powered 
technologies have made engineering support provision possible also from distance 
sites.
What also needs to be taken into account is that the integration of value chain 
activities cannot be confi ned to production: cyber-physical systems integrate the whole 
value chain (Kagermann et al, 2013). Moreover, digital technologies support not only 
production but also traditional headquarter tasks, such as supply chain management, 
value chain integration and coordination. Furthermore, these technologies enhance 
a variety of advanced business functions, such as product and process development, 
and logistics planning. They simplify and even automate other business functions, 
such as quality control, maintenance, accounting and order processing.
These arguments are strongly related to the reasoning about the competing 
defi nitions of industry 4.0 presented in the introductory section. They substantiate 
the “business model perspective” of industry 4.0, namely that industry 4.0 should 
not be restricted to technological novelties in manufacturing: it is rather about the 
competitive advantage gained from the digital transformation of business as a whole.
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These arguments make us advance the proposition that it is not the importance 
(the value chain position) of production that will be altered by the new manufacturing 
technologies. Individual business functions will seemingly move in the opposite 
direction along the smile curve: more and more knowledge-intensive support 
activities will be pushed to the bottom. 
Figure 1a
The original smile curve




 product and business concept, 
business development, R&D,
design, setup and








Support services supporting 
the core (manufacturing)
 activity
Source: Based on Mudambi [2008] with own supplements.
Altogether, the positions of individual business functions will become more 
uniform: the smile will rather take the shape of a bathtub (see fi gure 1a and 1b). 
At the bottom it will be wide and fl at, at the sides shorter and steeper. The changed 
shape of the curve represents that
 – more and more activities supporting production have become standard 
inputs that can be procured anywhere (Davenport, 2005);
 – production has become tightly integrated with the related knowledge-
intensive support activities, hence its value added increased;
 – the scope of strategic activities that determine companies’ ownership-
specifi c advantages (Dunning, 1993) decreased.
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Figure 1b
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specific after-sales services and 
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Source: Author’s editing.
Finally, some limitations of our research needs to be mentioned: fi rst and 
foremost the modest and not representative, also very special corporate sample, as 
well as the shortness of the analysed period of time. Additional research, the increase 
of the number of surveyed companies and industries, and international comparisons 
will be needed to establish
 – the balance of the skill-biased and skill destroying eff ects of new technologies;
 – the direction and the balance of the geographical reconfi guration of value 
adding activities
 – the impact of new manufacturing technologies on the specialisation, task 
portfolio and mandates of manufacturing subsidiaries.
Increased and more diversifi ed corporate samples and longer time periods will 
be needed to convincingly conclude that
 – global companies’ implementation of industry 4.0 technologies targets 
existing local manufacturing subsidiaries: instead of reshoring production 
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and the related support activities to advanced economies, existing off shore 
production capacities are upgraded;
 – the labour force (at least the white-collar employees) that becomes redundant 
as a consequence of production automation and robotisation will be absorbed 
by the newly created tasks;
 – industry 4.0 technologies will increase the number of value chain activities 
that are considered “operative” and, conversely, value chain coordinators 
consider fewer activities really strategic;
 – industry 4.0 technologies will reduce the diff erences in the value chain 
position (or rather, in the position along the smile curve) of the individual 
operative activities.
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Breakthrough or Dead End?
What Can we Learn from Abenomics?
LÁSZLÓ MURAKÖZY
The “Japanese miracle” after World War II was the one of the most magnifi cent 
periods of modern Japanese history. The rapid economic growth brought rising 
living standards, social harmony and satisfaction. By the 1980s Japan became one 
of the most developed countries in the world. However, as the 90s progressed the 
relative position of the country gradually deteriorated. On the surface Japan had 
seemed to manage the global crisis of the 1970s much better than other developed 
countries. At that time they implemented the same measures that had proved to be 
so successful before, and which although dampened the negative external eff ects 
prevented the country from adapting to the new situation thoroughly. It took leading 
countries two decades to get over this by adopting drastic measures and procedures 
and usher in the era of Great Moderation bringing an economic boom in the 90s 
and early 2000s. But not in Japan. The country that had been considered a success 
story for a long time faced a period of economic hardships, which is by no means 
a passing phase in the history of the country. The reasons for this were very deep 
and unique structural problems going back several decades. The quarter-of-a-
century-long agony of Japan could be rightly called the era of Great Stagnation. The 
objective of Abenomics is to break out of this hard situation. (The ambitious prime 
minister of Japan Shinzo Abe announced his comprehensive economic programme 
in 2012, which is now known as Abenomics.) In this paper we examine what new 
elements the Abe Shinzo administration has introduced to manage the crisis, what 
he has achieved so far and what are the prospects for the third largest economy of 
the world (Walatabe, 2015; Muraközy, 2016).*
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: E6, P1, O23.
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The exhaustion of the Japanese developmental state
In the decades following World War II Japan underwent unrivalled development 
and caught up with the most developed countries of the world. This is of historic 
signifi cance as it was the fi rst non-European country that achieved this, and it served 
as an example to other countries in Asia, that were to follow suit. The Japanese 
model was a unique combination of formal and informal institutions. Japanese 
culture having ancient Chinese roots was the perfect basis for development controlled 
by a remarkably strong and effi  cient state, and this manifested itself even in the 
behavioural patterns of economic players. On the one hand it is true that it laid the 
foundations of rapid economic growth, but on the other two of the most important 
institutions of developed economies – namely the market and political democracy 
– remained underdeveloped. With regard to the latter, the scheme that developed 
in the mid-fi fties has remained unchanged. A sort of one-party system with formal 
democratic institutions is in existence, which is tightly intertwined with the 
extremely rigid and strong state administration1. Eff ective democracy, as historical 
evidence strongly suggest, is not only a value in itself but also an important condition 
for the development of various competing strategies, and to make it possible for the 
political elite most suitable to implement the best strategy to take the helm. This can 
be especially crucial in such crisis-ridden and critical situations that Japan has got 
into over the past few decades. 
The eff ect of market processes in the Japanese model was lessened by the 
fact that the economy was dominated by gigantic keiretsus, which replaced the 
previous zaibatsus after World War II. These types of corporate groups centred on 
a well-capitalized core bank. The key role of these great banks, cross-shareholding, 
interlocking directorates and interdependence signifi cantly reduced the responsibility 
as well as the risk of corporations. The profi t orientation of member companies was 
quite weak. The banks in the centre of keiretsus provided fi nancial assistance or 
bailout facilities to member companies that were failing or making a loss. As a 
result the soft budget constraint formulated by János Kornai manifested itself in the 
Japanese private sector in a special way with all its negative eff ects. This – due to the 
unique nature of keiretsus – had to do with the strong state control over industries 
and monetary policy. The Japanese administration traditionally considered banking 
1 The fact that the seats of representatives in parliament are even today handed down from father 
to son – often publicly and ceremonially – lending an air of feudalism to the system is very indicative 
of the state of democracy in Japan.
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as a means of achieving various economic policy objectives. This would lead to 
providing loans that were not profi table investments. As a result a gigantic amount 
of bad loans accumulated in the banking industry over the decades, which had by 
the 1980s fundamentally weakened the Japanese fi nancial system. This contributed 
signifi cantly to the crisis unfolding in the 1990s, and even has a ripple-on eff ect 
today.
A lot of retired state bureaucrats got key positions on the boards of corporations, 
further strengthening the intensive relationship between them and the state. 
The state interfered with both economic and fi nancial processes through both 
formal and informal means. In Japan the unique situation of interlocking of state 
administration and businesses was an integral part of the organic network, as many 
state administrators – having attained high state positions – retired and then got top 
jobs with corporations, banks or other associations. This is the so-called amakudari, 
which can be translated as “descent from heaven”. As amakudari became an integral 
part of the system, it became the breeding ground for corruption and favouritism. 
Over long decades the social network between state administration, businesses and 
banks became so dense that it was virtually impossible to untangle (Muraközy, 2016, 
Abe–Fitzgerald, 1995).
By the last decades of the 20th century we were faced with the paradoxical 
situation, that the key elements of the Japanese model that originally led to the 
spectacular economic success, were not only insuffi  cient to secure the country a top 
position, but were actually the biggest hindrance to further development. With the 
spread of globalization this situation became increasingly more dramatic. By the 
nineties the economic growth of Japan became sluggish, the network of interlocking 
formal and informal institutions became a drag, and the deep structural problems and 
tensions became more and more visible. This led not only to the worsening relative 
position of Japan as a global economic power, but to grave crisis and a quarter-of-a-
century-long agony. 
In the Suff ocating Grip of External and Internal Challenges
Issues that had been simmering under the surface burst out in the early nineties in 
the form of a fi nancial crisis. In the eighties real estate and stock prices skyrocketed, 
and the situation was becoming more and more threatening. The infl ated bubble 
reached its peak in the second half of 1989, and the majority of investors still did 
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not perceive that stocks and real estates were overvalued. When the overpriced 
real estate and stock market collapsed in 1990, the previous enviable dynamism 
of Japan gave way to decades of stagnation in the country. Such types of bubbles 
tend to develop as a result of loose monetary policy, distortions in the tax system 
and fi nancial liberalisation. And Japan was no exception to the rule, but in addition 
there was a much more serious issue culminating, the Japanese model that was so 
successful previously came to a dead end. This also contributed to the fact that the 
bubble grew so huge, and the eff ect of the collapse so dramatic and long lasting. 
Table 1




2001 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
United 
States of 
America 3.7 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.2 1.4 2.1 2.4
United 
Kingdom 5.9 2.7 4.0 2.7 1.4 2.6 3.3 2.9 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
France 5.3 1.3 2.0 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.5 1.4
Japan 1.8 –0.1 1.7 0.6 0.2 –0.5 –0.8 0.3 –0.1 –1.4 –2.0 –1.2
Canada 4.2 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.1 2.3 1.6 1.2 –0.4 1.7 3.9 1.0
Germany 2.8 1.9 5.0 3.7 2.5 2.0 1.0 0.7 1.1 0.5 –0.3 1.4
Italy 9.5 3.2 4.5 3.9 3.5 5.0 5.3 2.4 2.7 1.7 2.1 2.6
Developed 
countries 4.9 2.0 3.2 2.7 2.2 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.3 0.9 1.3 1.8
Source: IMF [2000], p. 209, IMF [2002], p. 187.
Actually, the latter is the key issue here. Why was Japan not able to get over the 
fi nancial crisis in a couple of years, like other countries and regions hit by such crises 
have been able to? What led to the decades-long agony characterizing the country 
even today, to sluggish growth and defl ation returning to the country from time to 
time? We have not seen many cases of a fi nancial crisis paralyzing the economy of 
a country for long decades, and in spite of the repeated attempts to break free of 
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the defl ation and recession, the country has not been able to do so for a quarter of 
a century. This shows well that what we have at hand is much more than “simple” 
fi nancial crisis. Due to external and even greater internal challenges, Japan had 
to face increasingly more serious problems. The structural problems, institutional 
weaknesses, the explosion of tensions that had been simmering under the surface – 
which are mentioned in the introduction – came to light when the bubble burst. This 
was but a spectacular and painful outcome of a quite complex and unique course 
of events, signalling that the Japanese developmental state was coming to an end 
(Fukao, 2003, p. 366, Gibney, 1998, Garside, 2012, p. 70, Barsky, 2011, p. 17). 
Table 1 shows the peculiarity and ominousness of the situation after the collapse 
of the bubble. The very low rate of growth was accompanied by defl ation. Already 
in the 1980 the annual rate of infl ation in Japan was less than two per cent, while the 
average value in other developed countries was around fi ve per cent. But the period 
between 1992 and 2001 saw a moderate annual decrease in prices, i.e. defl ation in 
Japan. This was a unique moment in the history of the modern world economy, and 
posed an unprecedented challenge to Japanese monetary and fi scal policy. 
Reform attempts in the two decades before Abenomics
By the seventies and eighties under the radically diff erent external and internal 
conditions an economic development which focused only on short-term objectives 
and which was still controlled by state bureaucracy led to the weakening of 
fundamentals in Japan. This was a slow sinking process, the severity of which 
remained hidden, so the players did not notice it for a long time. The crisis of the 
early nineties, and the prolonged period of depression could have warned them of 
how grave the situation was, but people came to the realization very slowly. The once 
successful developmental model, the unmodifi ed economic policy practice, and the 
continued existence of former institutions and structures were but a hindrance to 
growth. In spite of the dangerously deteriorating situation it proved to be diffi  cult to 
change deep-seated attitudes and habits, which have pervaded all strata of Japanese 
business and society and have soaked into the minds of players over long decades 
and generations. 
The sluggishness of the economic and political system, the ineffi  ciency of 
instruments that were once so eff ective isolated Japan and caused the country to 
lag behind, while the majority of developed countries – through processes that 
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were sometimes painful and brought confl icts – adapted much better to the spread 
of globalization, and could enjoy the upswing brought by the Great Moderation. 
Another curious paradox about the Japanese situation is that it was the administration 
itself that was in charge of curtailing its own formal and informal power, which – 
needless to say – posed formidable challenges. Bureaucrats protected their positions 
in state administration, but what was even more detrimental was that its all-pervasive 
infl uence over the private sector was decreasing quite slowly. Although there were 
some attempts in the 80s and 90s at structural change, they were quite fragmented and 
had little impact (Callen–Ostry, 2003, Alexander, 2003, Bailey–Coff ey–Tomlinson, 
2007, Beason–Patterson, 2004).
The stagnation and defl ation period following the crisis of the 1990s forced 
out the fi rst reform concepts and measures that promised to be comprehensive and 
radical at least as far as its objectives went. All this occurred during the short term of 
Ryutaro Hashimoto, who was the prime minister of the country from 1996 to 1998. 
His objectives included loosening the harmful ties between the state and the private 
sector, strengthening the banking industry shaken by the fi nancial crisis, introducing 
more transparent rules and statements, and opening the extremely closed Japanese 
economy. In fact businesses had adapted but little to previous involuntary global 
economy opening processes. Ryutaro Hashimoto believed that the harmonization 
of Japanese and international accounting standards in the corporate sector was 
crucial. He realized that the interlocking of government, corporate management and 
the fi nancial sector was detrimental to competition, weakened the working of the 
market, making Japan less competitive. Administrative reform, the streamlining of 
the government, and reducing the power of bureaucracy were all key elements of 
Ryutaro Hashimoto’s programme.
The fi nancial crisis, the bursting of the bubble highlighted the weaknesses of the 
banking system. This fragility had developed much earlier, but could remain hidden 
for a long time due to the successes achieved. However, under the premiership of 
Ryutaro Hashimoto the initiative to reform the fi nancial system, which appeared to be 
a very a pressing need indeed, produced quite unimpressive results. The proportion 
of bad debts accumulated over the previous decade within the banking system was 
so high that in the end even the government backtracked on its original concept, and 
did not dare to face the imminent danger of the collapse of the banking system. So 
it was the government itself that softened the planned measures. Although there was 
no breakthrough, but the transformation and stabilisation of the fi nancial system 
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was started, even if in a lopsided way (Rosenbluth–Thies, 2010, pp. 95–154, Ihori–
Nakazato–Kawade, 2003, Ito–Patrick–Weinstein, 2005, pp. 107–147).
Ryutaro Hashimoto was followed by Keizo Obuchi and then by Joshiro Mori 
as head of government, who in some areas tried to follow in the footsteps of their 
predecessor, even if half-heartedly. Having said that their tenure can be described 
as a period when no signifi cant concepts were put forward and no decisive actions 
were taken. In 2001 Junichiro Koizumi took over as prime minister and remained 
in offi  ce until 2006. His was not in an enviable situation. In spite of the varying 
attempts at reform the interlocking, interdependence and network of relationships 
– verging on corruption – between state bureaucracy actors, politicians as well as 
corporate and bank managers was still strong. This minimized the impact of market 
forces very much. This greatly hampered recovery. Junichiro Koizumi – meeting 
the demands of the majority of the population – promised to bring radical changes. 
The main rallying cry was the eff ective implementation of structural reforms. This 
was an important turning point, because it indicated the realization that it was not 
merely a passing situation caused simply by some issues facing the fi nancial system 
or bad economic policy, but the eff ect of deep-rooted, fundamental structural and 
institutional problems.
From an economic aspect structural reforms tend to increase the importance 
of the market and help create a smaller, more effi  cient and less intervening state. 
Another objective might be deregulation, trade liberalisation, increasing the role 
of competition and strengthening the fi nancial sector. The part of the reform 
that most concerns the state is privatisation, fi scal and tax reform as well as the 
rationalisation of the welfare and pension system. The structural changes stated by 
Junichiro Koizumi – at least what the prime minister actually announced publicly 
– were to cover this whole spectrum. His premiership launched more powerful and 
comprehensive reform eff orts, which have been trying to reverse the downward 
trend and get Japan out of the ditch with varying strength and intensity. These 
repeated eff orts tried to get the country out of the defl ation-recession spiral. The 
comprehensive eff orts of Junichiro Koizumi were aimed at reforming the whole 
economic, social and political system of Japan, as he realized how tightly intertwined 
and interrelated these areas were. The multi-party system – only multi-party in 
name –, the cemented interlocking network has been able to block radical changes. 
In order to implement the economic reforms eff ectively Junichiro Koizumi tried 
to strengthen the role of prime minister as leader as well within the government 
structure (Vietor, 2007, pp. 221–244, Mulgan, 2013).
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Junichiro Koizumi meant to intensify the market by assigning a central role to 
consolidating and transforming banks. What made it easier for the prime minister to 
make his plans about the strengthening of the bank system come true was that some 
signifi cant changes had already been made in the regulatory and control institutions 
of the fi nancial sector over the last few years. The most important of them being that 
the central bank law of 1998 made the Bank independent.2 Another key measure 
was the consolidation of fi nancial supervision (Cargill–Hutchinson–Ito, 2000, pp. 
83–112, Hutchinson–Westernman, 2006, pp. 12–14, 33–156).
The legally independent central bank faced quite diffi  cult challenges in the early 
years of the third millennium. The biggest challenge to monetary policy in Japan was 
not infl ation but defl ation. Which meant that the orthodox instruments of national 
banks could be used with either low effi  ciency or were completely ineff ective. The 
interest rate, which was 8.2 per cent in March 1991, was lowered to virtually zero 
in eight years by March 1999, minimizing its role to infl uence the economy. In this 
situation decision makers had to fi nd novel monetary assets. However, the central 
bank was slow to react, assessed the actual threats of defl ation with considerable 
delay, and took a long time to identify the appropriate means. To the Bank of Japan’s 
credit, it was a pioneer, taking a path never trodden before, or at least not in the 
period of modern fi nances since the end of World War II.3 It only introduced the 
policy of quantitative easing after long years in March 2001. In this scheme the 
Bank of Japan increased the money supply signifi cantly. Although the central bank 
declared that it was resolute to continue this policy as long as prices start increasing, 
even prolonged quantitative easing could not put an end to stagnation (Hutchinson–
Westerman, 2006, pp. 10–11).
One of the main ambitions of Junichiro Koizumi was to stop or at least reduce 
state subsidies, aid, as this was the hotbed of political corruption and pulling 
strings4. State debt, which was increasing at a dangerous speed, made reforms in 
2 It is very telling of the continuity of the history of Japan that the Act on the National Bank of 
1998 replaced a law enacted in 1942. For more than half a century the operations of the Bank of Japan 
were based on a law that was drafted to suit the then prevailing conditions of a war economy (Cargill–
Hutchison–Ito, 2000, pp. 83–112).
3 However, after a couple of years the instruments and practice of the up-till-then unique Japanese 
monetary policy began to be appreciated and received international attention. After the crisis of 
2007/2009 other countries relied on the experience of Japan, of course adopting the monetary policy to 
be followed to their own situation (Botman, 2015; Hoshi–Kashyap, 2015).
4 Even in 2006, at the end of the Koizumi era – in spite of rationalisation – state-owned fi nancial 
institutions received 455 million yen (USD 4.5 billion) support from the budget. But the actual amount 
was much larger as state-owned banks did not have to pay corporate tax, and they got interest-free 
loans from the budget. According to some estimates if we calculated all these, state-owned fi nancial 
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the public sector as well as stopping the practice of heavily subsidizing those rural 
constituencies that were the strongholds of the Liberal Party more and more urgent. 
Although these eff orts were very popular with the majority of the population, they 
were strongly opposed by the representatives of the party (Park, 2011, p. 236–237; 
Shinoda, 2013, pp. 76–117).
The fundamental, wide-ranging reforms announced at the beginning of Junichiro 
Koizumi’s term were only partly carried through. What made implementation more 
diffi  cult was that previous governments had introduced fi scal stimulus packages, 
which made the budgetary situation even worse and increased the indebtedness of 
the government. However, the necessary fi scal stringency measures understandably 
dented the popularity of the government. Partly as a result of the reforms carried out 
by Junichiro Koizumi and partly as a result of the global, and more specifi cally the 
Asian economic boom, the macroeconomic situation of Japan improved somewhat. 
Growth prospects, stock market indices and the position of the banking system 
became more favourable as well. Junichiro Koizumi’s work was greatly appreciated 
abroad, but domestically opposition was growing, and the reform lost momentum. In 
2006 Junichiro Koizumi announced that he would step down from offi  ce. Shinzo Abe, 
who was a close associate of his as head of the Prime Minister's Offi  ce, succeeded 
him as both the president of the party and as prime minister, albeit briefl y, for only 
one year this time.
Shinzo Abe, at the beginning of his fi rst premiership, took the helm at a time when 
the situation was relatively good. Although he announced the radical transformation 
of the post-war Japanese system – which suggested that he would continue what 
his predecessor started –, although not much of it was realized this time around. 
In the 2007 upper-house elections the Liberal Democratic Party suff ered a historic 
defeat. This was mainly due to the party’s own fl aws and great corruption scandals. 
Shinzo Abe could still remain in offi  ce for a short time, but instead of implementing 
real reforms he was just fi ghting for his political survival. In the end he resigned 
after one year in offi  ce. The two prime ministers Yasuo Fukuda and then Taro Aso 
succeeding Shinzo Abe, and both serving a brief term, could not stop the declining 
popularity of the Liberal Democratic Party, and in the lower-house elections of 2009 
the Democratic Party of Japan – formed when smaller opposition parties merged a 
year earlier – led by Yukio Hatoyama pulled off  a landslide victory. What contributed 
institutions cost the state nearly 1 billion yen a year around the turn of the millennium. This is one of 
the symptoms of soft budget constraint uniquely present the mixed economy of Japan (Park, 2011, pp. 
236–237).
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to the defeat was that the growth that began in the middle of the fi rst decade of the 
twenty fi rst century – which was partly due to the reform measures implemented by 
Junichiro Koizumi – was broken by the economic crisis of 2007–2009. The decades-
long dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party seemed to be coming to an end 
(Kiglics, 2011, pp. 115–136).
The government led by the Democratic Party of Japan started reviewing budgetary 
expenditure with great vigour, trying to fi nd opportunities for rationalisation and 
saving. However, it soon turned out that it was quite diffi  cult to change things in a 
budget that developed over long decades and was quite complicated. And this meant 
there were no funds to fulfi l election promises from. Although Yukio Hatoyama 
governed in the name of a new party, in many ways it was just continuing in the 
direction set by the Liberal Democratic Party administration. Like his reform-
minded predecessors he also tried to reduce the power of bureaucracy and improve 
the effi  ciency of state control. The Democratic Party of Japan could only fulfi l a small 
portion of the election promises it had made, and even Hatoyama Yukio came under 
suspicion in relation to a fi nance scandal, and was forced to hand over the reins to 
Naoto Kan. The governing party was defeated in the early upper-house elections, 
not least because contrary to what they promised in their campaign programme they 
were planning to raise the consumption tax to 10 per cent. This contributed to the 
defeat of the party in spite of the fact that the tax hike seemed undoubtedly necessary 
(Koellner, 2011).
Abenomics
In the 2012 elections – after a short detour – Japanese political system was back to 
normal, as had been since the mid 1950s, without any real challengers, to a one-party 
rule. The Liberal Democratic Party led by Shinzo Abe5 returned to power. The new 
cabinet had to tackle the following interconnected challenges: defl ation, moderate 
potential growth, massive defi cit, increasing government debt, aging population, 
declining work force and acute social problems. The weight of the problems is clearly 
indicated by the fact that the nominal GDP of Japan decreased by more than seven 
5 Shinzo Abe is a member of one of the most prominent Japanese political dynasties. His father 
fi lled ministerial positions, his maternal grandfather was Nobusuke Kishi, who served as prime minister 
of the country between 1957 and 1960 – and played a key role in shaping the developmental state. 
Eisaku Sato, the second longest-running prime minister of Japan, was also a relative of Shinzo Abe.
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per cent in the 16 years between 1997 and 2013, while government debt was around 
230 per cent of the GDP in 2015 (OECD, 2015a, pp. 10–18, Schiff , 2015).
The economic policy dubbed Abenomics of the newly elected government of 
Shinzo Abe seemed rather novel, and received global attention, although if we look 
at what it consisted of, it was merely rehashing some of the Japanese recipes that 
had been used in earlier decades, and which had not achieved the necessary deep 
structural changes. Therefore it is crucial to look at the period of Abenomics in 
the context of the country’s past quarter-of-a-century long history characterized 
by the struggle to fi ght defl ation and stagnation and also look at its prospects this 
way and make clear that Japan would fi nally have to fi nd a solution to problems 
that accumulated over the past 50 years. To understand Shinzo Abe’s concepts, 
determination and programme it is absolutely crucial to see that he was one of the 
closest colleagues and then successor of Junichiro Koizumi, the most charismatic 
pro-reform prime minister of the previous two decades. If we look at the programme 
of Abenomics carefully, we can see that it is in many ways the continuation and 
further development of Junichiro Koizumi's ideas, drawing on the lessons of failures 
and with weaknesses corrected. 
With all these things considered Abenomics was more radical, more 
comprehensive and more coordinated than the programmes that came before it. It 
identifi ed more accurately the critical mass required to make a breakthrough and 
achieve real results, and assessed the main areas and their interactions much better. 
From the experience of Junichiro Koizumi as Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe learnt that 
he needed to secure a very powerful political majority to support him. He also realized 
that it was not only parliamentary power that was crucial to success, but credibility, 
persuasive communication that can help him get the support of the corporate world 
as well as the support of the population. This latter, excellent political marketing is 
one of the main strengths of his premiership. He took the helm armed with fi erce 
determination and powerful nationalist rhetoric.
The great international interest in Abenomics was aroused not only by the 
decades-long agony of Japan and the charismatic personality of the prime minister 
or his strong statements. The 2007–2009 crisis forced the governments of developed 
countries all over the world to face the problem of what economic policy instruments 
can be used to break out of stagnation when state debt is high, growth is slow, infl ation 
is low or there is defl ation even, and all conventional instruments have failed. In the 
period of refl ection and experimentation to fi nd the way out, which characterized the 
past years divided members of the profession as well as politicians about what the 
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best way to success is. The crisis and slow growth would clearly require a fi scal and 
monetary economic policy to stimulate the economy. 
However, conventional fi scal stimuli lead to greater and greater defi cits, reaching 
budget limits and leading to further indebtedness. If equilibrium considerations are 
in serious danger, state expenditures need to be cut and/or taxes have to be increased, 
which may wreck growth that is fragile to begin with. Massive government debt 
means a great repayment burden, which makes the fi scal policy situation even more 
diffi  cult. The crisis and the period following it led to low infl ation or even near-
defl ation at many places. In such a climate near zero interest rate and monetary 
policy can no longer rely on orthodox instruments and channels. Novel, innovative, 
unorthodox measures have to be taken, as remarkably the Fed in America has done 
in recent years. 
On the one hand increasing the quantity of the money may help start lending, 
and boost business activities. However, there are other factors that are also needed to 
do so, e.g. increasingly stronger positive expectations, growing demand, profi table 
investment opportunities and the like. However, enormous liquidity surplus has 
developed on national fi nancial markets as well as globally as a result of monetary 
policies, increasing the chance of risks, bubbles and fi nancial crises developing in 
the future. The situation is quite tense in Europe, the European Union and in the 
Eurozone in particular. The above may indicate that the decades-long problems 
in Japan have by now appeared, or are becoming visible, in developed countries 
worldwide. The problem of defl ation, which seemed to be but a unique Japanese 
phenomenon, identifying the opportunities and limitations of monetary and fi scal 
recovery in a depressed economy with no infl ation has by now appeared as a problem 
to be solved in other parts of the global economy. This is why Japanese economic 
policy experiments have become so valuable in global economic and economic policy 
thought shaken by the crisis of 2007–2009. Of course, we have to be very cautious 
about what seem to be parallels on the surface as well as examples and advice that 
seem to be apt and applicable to the situation at hand. This is especially true with 
the very unique Japanese economy. The causes as well as the social, political and 
economic background are very diff erent in Japan, Europe and the United States, so 
we have to be very careful when we draw parallels between them (Botban, 2015, 
Hutchinson–Westerman, 2006).
The similarity of symptoms – with regard to the adoption and application of 
specifi c economic policy methods – may not mean that the outcome and the treatment 
of the problems should also be the same in countries that are in very diff erent 
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situations. We also have to be careful with the undesired side eff ects of therapies, 
which often have a lot to do with the diff erences between the countries. Although the 
symptoms often appear to be the same, the nature of the underlying illness may be 
quite diff erent. The challenge of overcoming a fi nancial crisis in a country that has 
had a democratic market economy for centuries, like in the United States of America, 
is quite diff erent from that facing Japan whose stagnation and defl ation-related 
problems are the result of structures that were left unchanged for many decades. 
It is no accident that fi scal stimulus and monetary quantitative expansion seemed 
to be much more eff ective in the USA than in Japan, where repeated attempts were 
made with no apparent eff ects. All this may call for caution about our fi ndings; what 
conclusions can be drawn and when we make an evaluation. However, comparing 
countries and regions with diff erent locations and traditions adds to our knowledge 
about the opportunities of fi scal and monetary policy and how they work, and this 
can help us make a better use of them in the future (Korniyenko–Loukoinova, 2015, 
Ueda, 2012).
The enormous challenges facing the Shinzo Abe administration 
When Shinzo Abe became prime minister of Japan for the second time, the 
position he found himself in was not better than it had been a couple years before, 
when he succeeded Junichiro Koizumi as premier of Japan. By then we could talk not 
about just a lost decade but about almost quarter of a century, in which the country 
could not break out of the circle of defl ation, slow growth and losing its relative 
position on the global market. Tables 2 and 3 show this quite well.
Table 2
Annual real GDP growth rate between 1991 and 2017
1991–2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
United States of 
America 3.5 1.8 2.8 3.8 3.3 2.7 1.8 –0.3
United Kingdom 2.8 2.5 3.3 2.5 3.0 2.7 2.6 –0.5
Finland 3.2 1.7 2.0 3.9 2.8 4.1 5.2 0.7
France 2.2 1.1 0.8 2.6 1.6 2.6 2.3 0.1
Ireland 7.8 5.9 3.9 4.4 6.4 6.3 5.5 –2.2
Japan 0.8 0.3 1.7 2.4 1.3 1.7 2.2 –1.0
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1991–2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Korea 6.4 7.4 2.9 4.9 3.9 5.2 5.5 2.8
Germany 1.6 0.0 –0.7 0.7 0.9 3.9 3.4 0.8
Italy 1.6 0.3 0.2 1.4 1.1 2.1 1.4 –1.1
Switzerland 1.4 0.1 0.0 2.8 3.0 4.0 4.1 2.3
Sweden 2.4 2.1 2.5 3.8 2.8 4.9 3.5 –0.7
OECD average 2.8 1.7 2.1 3.2 2.8 3.2 2.7 0.2
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
United States of 
America –2.8 2.5 1.6 2.2 1.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4
United Kingdom –4.2 1.5 2.0 1.2 2.2 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.3
Finland –8.3 3.0 2.6 –1.4 –1.1 –0.4 –0.1 1.1 1.6
France –2.9 1.9 2.1 0.2 0.7 0.2 1.1 1.3 1.6
Ireland –5.7 0.4 2.6 0.1 1.4 5.2 5.6 4.1 3.5
Japan –5.5 4.7 –0.5 1.7 1.6 –0.1 0.6 1.0 0.5
Korea 0.7 6.5 3.7 2.3 2.9 3.3 2.7 3.1 3.6
Germany –5.6 3.9 3.7 0.6 0.4 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.0
Italy –5.5 1.7 0.7 –2.9 –1.8 –0.4 0.8 1.4 1.4
Switzerland –2.1 3.0 1.8 1.1 1.8 1.9 0.7 1.1 1.6
Sweden –5.1 5.7 2.7 0.0 1.2 2.4 2.9 3.1 3.0
OECD average –3.4 3.0 1.9 1.3 1.2 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.3
Source: OECD [2015d], p. 245 (2015–2017 forecast).
By 2012-2013 the temporary improvement that had occurred in the mid 2000s 
in the growth performance of Japan, which confi rmed Junichiro Koizumi’s reform 
eff orts, and served as proof that the country was headed in the right direction, 
was long forgotten. The positive tendencies were curbed by the 2007–2009 global 
economic crisis and the involuntary resignation of Junichiro Koizumi. We have seen 
quite poor growth performance and even some downturn in 2011 and 2014. The real 
GDP growth was around no more than half a per cent in 2015, and the 2016 and 2017 
prospects are not very promising either. Slow growth goes hand in hand with the 
gradually worsening position of Japan in the global economy over the past quarter of 
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a century. After decades of the economic miracle when Japan caught up with other 
developed countries, the country is now slowly but defi nitely lagging behind. The 
Shinzo Abe government was faced with slow growth and a near-defl ation situation, 
improved temporarily only by the VAT increase in 2008 and 2014, but then low 
infl ation returned. Although this does not make the problems of the current Japanese 
government any less serious, unlike in the years before and after the turn of the 
millennium – see table 3 – low infl ation, which was previously considered a unique 
Japanese phenomenon, is much less unique in the developed world, as today a lot of 
European countries and the Eurozone as well are in a near-defl ation situation.
Table 3
Annual growth rate of the consumer price index between 1991 and 2017
1992–2002 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
United States of America 2.7 1.6 2.3 2.7 3.4 3.2 2.9 3.8
United Kingdom 2.1 1.3 1.4 1.3 2.0 2.3 2.3 3.6
Finland 1.9 2.0 1.3 0.1 0.8 1.3 1.6 3.9
France 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.6 3.2
Ireland 4.7 4.0 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.1
Japan 0.4 –0.9 –0.3 0.0 –0.6 0.2 0.1 1.4
Korea 4.6 2.8 3.5 3.6 2.8 2.2 2.5 4.7
Germany 1.4 1.0 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.3 2.8
Italy 3.3 2.6 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.0 3.5
Switzerland 1.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.1 0.7 2.4
Sweden 1.6 2.2 1.9 0.4 0.5 1.4 2.2 3.4
Eurozone 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 3.3
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
United States of 
America –0.3 1.6 3.1 2.1 1.5 1.6 0.0 1.0 1.8
United Kingdom 2.2 3.3 4.5 2.8 2.6 1.5 0.1 1.5 2.0
Finland 1.6 1.7 3.3 3.2 2.2 1.2 –0.2 0.4 0.8
France 0.1 1.7 2.3 2.2 1.0 0.6 0.1 1.0 1.2
Ireland –1.7 –1.6 1.2 1.9 0.5 0.3 0.1 1.6 2.0
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Japan –1.4 –0.7 –0.3 0.0 0.4 2.7 0.8 0.7 2.3
Korea 2.8 2.9 4.0 2.2 1.3 1.3 0.7 1.6 2.0
Germany 0.2 1.2 2.5 2.1 1.6 0.8 0.1 1.0 1.6
Italy 0.8 1.6 2.9 3.3 1.3 0.2 0.2 0.8 1.1
Switzerland –0.5 0.7 0.2 –0.7 –0.2 0.0 –1.2 –0.5 0.1
Sweden –0.5 1.2 3.0 0.9 0.0 –0.2 0.1 1.4 2.2
Eurozone 0.3 1.6 2.7 2.5 1.3 0.4 0.1 0.9 1.3
Source: OECD [2015d], p. 262 (2015–2017 forecast).
A brief review of the symptoms indicates that two decades after the bursting 
of the Japanese fi nancial bubble, in spite of the numerous reform attempts the 
Japanese economy has not been able to overcome the crisis it is in, and has not 
been able to solve its basic structural problems. All this is coupled with current 
issues, a great government budget defi cit, enormous government debt as well as 
complex demographic and social problems, and to make things worse, all this in a 
global environment where it is increasingly more diffi  cult to keep up with others in 
a cut-throat competition. What made the twenty-year-long agony of Japan even more 
striking is that meanwhile the part of Asia nearest to Japan has become one of the 
most dynamically growing regions of the world. Former followers have become the 
fi ercest and at the same time closest competitors in the global economic competition. 
The “three arrows” programme of Abenomics
In the diffi  cult economic-demographic situation – having learnt a lot from 
earlier failures – Shinzo Abe launched his “three arrows” programme aimed at 
the recovery of the country with great determination. The three arrows are (1) 
aggressive monetary policy, (2) fl exible/expansionary fi scal policy and (3) structural 
reforms. The continuity between Abenomics and earlier reform eff orts is obvious. It 
is enough to call to mind the plans and actions of Ryutaro Hashimoto but especially 
Junichiro Koizumi. The objective and purpose of this as well as previous reform 
eff orts was to get Japan out of the defl ation spiral and set the country on a sustained 
growth path. The most diffi  cult issue and at the same time the cornerstone of 
“three arrows” programme was (and still is) the structural reforms that were aimed 
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at solving and resolving inherited historical problems. Based on earlier Japanese 
as well as international experience it is clear that only structural and institutional 
transformation can create a basis for greater and sustainable growth. And this is the 
central issue of the economic policy of every country. Without this expansionary 
fi scal policy and monetary expansion, important as they may be, are only scratching 
the surface, and cannot achieve the desired eff ect. In the fi rst decade of the 21st 
century we registered only 0.8 per cent annual growth, much lower than what the 
majority of developed countries had. 
The situation of Shinzo Abe’s government was and still is made even more diffi  cult 
by the fact, that what we are facing is not a cyclical slump, but the rate of potential 
growth is also quite low. In the 90s after the bubble burst the decline of investment 
and the decrease in total factor productivity caused the level of potential output to 
drop signifi cantly as well. As of the turn of the millennium total factor productivity 
began to grow, but investments still remained at a very low level. Another blow for 
long-term growth was connected to demographic problems: workforce was declining 
in Japan’s rapidly aging society. Sustained defl ation also hindered economic growth 
and limited the scope of monetary policy. 
It became clear to Shinzo Abe – based on the experience gained, and the failed 
attempts of the past decades – that sustained results can be obtained only through a 
comprehensive, extensive, coordinated and concerted reform process. Only this can 
lay the foundations for sustained, dynamic growth, without which – as international 
experience shows – not even the much needed fi scal consolidation measures can be 
implemented. The action programme launched in 2013 is based on the assessment 
of synergies of the simultaneous implementation of the building blocks of the “three 
arrows” programme. It is assumed that monetary expansion and expansionary fi scal 
policy can help break out of the defl ation spiral, which in combination with low 
real interest rates can create a favourable climate for investment, consumption, and 
with the depreciation of the yen, exports as well. The above may give a short-term 
boost. If comprehensive structural reforms are launched simultaneously, this may 
bolster confi dence and heighten expectations about the future. All this can induce 
more rapid growth on the long run as well, which may facilitate fi scal consolidation, 
decrease government defi cit and slow down the dynamic increase of government 
debt. The idea is that through the growth triggered the considerable cost of aggressive 
monetary and fi scal expansion and its equilibrium risk can be reimbursed (Botman–
Danninger–Schiff , 2015, Hamada–Kashyap–Weinstein, 2011).
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Monetary policy
In March 2013 prime minister Shinzo Abe – without even pretending to respect 
the independence of the Bank of Japan – very aggressively nominated his own 
confi dant Haruhiko Kuroda, former president of the Asian Development Bank as 
the governor of the central bank. The two-year target was to raise infl ation to 2 per 
cent sustainably by 2015.6 The Bank of Japan used various instruments to achieve 
this cognizant of the fact that all this will be insuffi  cient without fi scal policy being 
adjusted to this target and without carrying out structural reforms. The instruments 
used were one called quantitative easing, which was used by the Fed in America after 
the 2007–2009 crisis and which received a lot of attention worldwide. Quantitative 
expansion, the fi rst arrow of Abenomics to be implemented, set the target of doubling 
the monetary base in the period between 2013 and 2015. In the spring of 2013 the 
balance sheet of the Bank of Japan was around 34 per cent of the country's GDP, 
which was already higher than that of the USA (19 per cent), the United Kingdom 
(27 per cent) or the European Central Bank (28 per cent). 
In two year’s time, in the spring of 2015, as the result of aggressive monetary 
expansion the balance sheet total of the Bank of Japan was as high as 65 per cent of 
the GDP. In early 2015 in the United States it was 25 per cent of the GDP while in 
the Eurozone it was 21 per cent. However, the continuous expansion poses serious 
future risks. If the economic recovery really starts, this may run up interest rates in 
the future. But the failure of Abenomics, the loss of investors’ confi dence or external 
fi nancial factors can have similar eff ects. If this happens the gigantic debt burden 
can skyrocket, which may rock the foundations of the whole fi nancial system of 
Japan (OECD, 2015a, p. 33, Hausman–Wieland, 2014, pp. 23–25, Rickards, 2014, 
Arslanalp–Lam, 2013). 
6 Defl ation is indeed a very unique problem of the Japanese economy. The GDP defl ator decreased 
by 13 per cent between 2001 and 2013, and monthly consumer price index increased only in 12 months 
in this period. If there had been at least one per cent infl ation in this period since 2001, the nominal 
GDP growth would have been 1.75 percentage points higher and public debt would be around 160 per 
cent of the GDP instead of the current 230 per cent. The Bank of Japan already tried really aggressive 
monetary policy to stop defl ation between 2001 and 2006, but failed (Koo, 2015, pp. 153–198).
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Source: OECD [2015d], p. 167.
Despite all its eff orts the Bank of Japan did not hit the 2 percent infl ation target 
by 2015 at all. As fi gure 1 shows only the April 2014 consumption tax hike resulted 
in a volatile price increase, but its impact wore off  soon, while it reduced domestic 
demand signifi cantly. By the end of 2015 infl ation rate was back at 0.5 per cent. 
Which is very telling, as core infl ation is around that level. On the other hand, the 
gigantic quantitative expansion programme, while its impact is limited and only 
short term, involves major future risks. Japanese monetary easing was therefore 
exceptionally bulky compared to others using similar instruments like the Fed, the 
United Kingdom and the Eurozone which has partly started to follow suit. However, 
the scene in Japan, a country facing a prolonged and grave crisis was very diff erent 
from that in the United States or Europe for that matter, so the oversupply of liquidity 
produced but unimpressive results (Hausman–Wieland, 2014, Fujiwara–Nakazono–
Ueda, 2015).
Fiscal policy
The experience of Abenomics show that even the most powerful monetary 
policy may only produce limited results. The fi scal policy harmonised with it and 
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especially comprehensive structural reforms may bring about considerable changes 
in the economy as well as in the society, they may boost corporate borrowing and 
investment. As government debt is enormous and therefore very signifi cant in the 
operation of Japanese fi nancial markets, in many respects fi scal policy has had a 
greater impact on this sector as well, than monetary policy would be capable of. This 
again is a very important peculiar Japanese trait to consider. It is because of this as 
well as other factors that the role of monetary policy – in spite of its aggressiveness 
and extensiveness – is still quite limited. It is because of this – and the lessons learned 
from earlier failed attempts – that the Bank of Japan emphasises that monetary and 
fi scal policy and structural reforms need to implemented simultaneously (IMF, 
2015a).
The other important pivot of the “three arrows” programme in addition to 
monetary expansion is expansionary fi scal policy. This has been used quite often 
before as well, but due to the enormous government debt and defi cit the consideration 
of fi scal consolidation proved to be more important. The confl ict between the two 
considerations has caused certain cyclicity in the fi nancial aff airs of Japan. As part 
of the Abenomics programme they implemented a stimulus package equal to 1.5 per 
cent of the GDP. As a result public investment grew by 8 per cent in 2013, in contrast 
to 2.7 per cent the year before, and especially to the 8 per cent decrease seen in 2011. 
However, public investment grew only by 3.8 per cent in 2014, while a signifi cant 
drop in public investment is expected in 2015–2016. 
This is a clear indication that with such high defi cit and government debt fi scal 
stimulus and fi scal consolidation will come into confl ict even in a short term. As the 
fi rst measure of consolidation – as had been planned originally – consumption tax 
was raised from 5 to 8 per cent in April 2014. However, this stunted growth, which 
was quite modest to begin with. According to the original plans the consumption tax 
was to be raised a second time to 10 per cent in October 2015. However this second 
hike was delayed by 18 months to April 2017. This way however the fi scal balance 
will deteriorate further, which means that fi scal consolidation will be an even more 
painful process, with greater and greater sacrifi ce ratio. By 2015 it became clear 
that the scenario to solve fi scal disequilibria painted in 2012 by the Shinzo Abe 
government was overly optimistic (Lech Valier, 2014, pp. 51–54, IMF, 2015b, p. 32).
In spite of recent failures the importance of fi scal consolidation cannot be 
stressed enough in the ominous shadow of growing government debt. In 1990 the 
gross public debt of Japan was only 65.3 per cent of GDP, while in 2000 it was 136.1 
per cent of GDP, and today the gross national debt of the country is the highest 
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among developed countries, at around a whopping 230 per cent of the GDP: Although 
funding the public debt has not been a problem so far, as Japanese investors and 
especially households prefer to invest in government securities. Domestic funding in 
the Japanese defl ationary environment – due to low interest rates – even with such 
enormous government debt puts relatively little strain on the national budget. The 
net interest payment of the government is quite low in international comparison. 
However, if Japan is unable to make a sharp turn, and implement the “three arrows” 
programme, as a result of increasing government debt the country may need external 
funds, which would impose a heavy burden on the country and increase the risk. 
The situation is quite serious, according to OECD calculations if the trend continues 
the gross government debt of Japan may exceed 410 per cent of the GDP by 2040 
(OECD, 2015a, p. 15, p. 32, pp. 109–115, Arslanalp–Lam, 2013, Shigeki, 2005). 
Table 4
General government fi nancial balances as a percent of nominal GDP, 
1998–2017
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
United States of 
America –0.4 0.0 0.8 –1.4 –4.8 –6.0 –5.5 –4.2 –3.1 –3.7
United Kingdom –0.2 0.7 1.1 0.4 –2.1 –3.4 –3.6 –3.5 –2.9 –3.0
Finland 1.6 1.7 6.9 5.0 4.1 2.4 2.2 2.6 3.9 5.1
France –2.4 –1.6 –1.3 –1.4 –3.1 –3.9 –3.5 –3.2 –2.3 –2.5
Ireland 2.0 2.4 4.9 1.0 –0.3 0.7 1.4 1.3 2.8 0.3
Japan –10.3 –7.1 –7.5 –6.0 –7.7 –7.7 –5.9 –4.8 –1.3 –2.1
Korea 0.6 1.6 4.4 3.0 3.5 –2.0 0.2 1.6 2.3 4.2
Germany –2.5 –1.7 0.9 –3.1 –3.9 –4.2 –3.8 –3.4 –1.7 0.2
Italy –3.0 –1.8 –1.3 –3.4 –3.1 –3.4 –3.6 –4.2 –3.6 –1.5
Switzerland –1.9 –0.9 –0.4 –0.8 –2.7 –2.4 –2.2 –1.2 0.3 0.9
Sweden 0.9 0.8 3.2 1.4 –1.5 –1.3 0.3 1.8 2.2 3.3
OECD average –2.3 –1.2 –0.4 –1.8 –3.6 –4.3 –3.6 –2.8 –1.6 –1.5
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
United States of 
America –7.2 –12.8 –12.2 –10.8 –9.0 –5.5 –5.1 –4.5 –4.2 –3.7
United Kingdom –5.1 –10.8 –9.7 –7.7 –8.3 –5.7 –5.7 –3.9 –2.6 –1.5
Finland 4.2 –2.5 –2.6 –1.0 –2.1 –2.5 –3.3 –3.3 –2.7 –1.6
France –3.2 –7.2 –6.8 –5.1 –4.8 –4.1 –3.9 –3.8 –3.4 –2.8
Ireland –7.0 –13.8 –32.3 –12.5 –8.0 –5.7 –3.9 –2.1 –1.1 –0.3
Japan –1.9 –8.8 –8.3 –8.8 –8.7 –8.5 –7.7 –6.7 –5.7 –5.0
Korea 2.3 –1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.8
Germany –0.2 –3.2 –4.2 –1.0 –0.1 –0.1 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.9
Italy –2.7 –5.3 –4.2 –3.5 –3.0 –2.9 –3.0 –2.6 –2.2 –1.6
Switzerland 2.0 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.2 –0.3 –0.2 –0.2 –0.3 –0.2
Sweden 2.0 –0.7 0.0 –0.1 –0.9 –1.4 –1.7 –1.1 –0.6 –0.3
OECD average –3.6 –8.4 –7.9 –6.6 –5.8 –4.1 –3.8 –3.3 –2.8 –2.3
Source: OECD [2015d], p. 271 (2015–2017 forecast).
The high government debt has run up as a result of the combination of defi cits 
incurred over decades of repeated but unsuccessful fi scal stimulus measures and the 
frequent decrease in nominal GDP due to defl ation. Table 4 shows that in the years 
around the turn of the millennium in Japan – unlike in other developed countries with 
relatively balanced budgets – the defi cit was substantial, amounting to 8-10 per cent 
of the GDP. By 2006–2008 the country managed to reduce the defi cit, but then the 
positive tendencies were broken by the unfolding global fi nancial crisis. After this 
massive defi cits of up to 7–9 per cent of the GDP returned in Japan. All this warns us 
that Japanese economic policy can only follow a quite narrow path, as if the government 
achieves one of its main targets, namely price increase, interest rates will also run up, 
making it more diffi  cult to fund the enormous government debt, and at one point can 
even hamper the recovery of private investment as well (OECD, 2015d, p 271).
The complexity of the situation is illustrated by the estimate made by the OECD 
in 2015 modelling the paths for Japan in the 25 years between 2014 and 2040 (OECD, 
2015a). The authors examined three possible scenarios, with diff erences – at fi rst glance 
quite small diff erences – in the growth and infl ation fi gures used in the calculations. 
However, because of the length of the period under scrutiny these little diff erences 
resulted in very diff erent paths for the country, and after a quarter of a century they 
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produced very diff erent results with regard to the position of Japan. The two key 
variables used in the calculations were real GDP growth and infl ation rate. These 
two already determine how the third variable, nominal GDP will change. These three 
input values varied in the calculations, while the four output variables were long-term 
interest rate, current account and primary budget balance and gross government debt.
The fi rst one is the baseline, which is the projection of the current growth path 
into the future, paints a rather gloomy picture. Here the one per cent real growth 
is accompanied by 1.75 per cent infl ation. This combination would result in a 
growing current account defi cit, which would be nearly one quarter of the GDP by 
2040, while the gross government debt would reach 413 per cent of the GDP. The 
baseline indicates the danger noted earlier, i.e. that higher infl ation – accompanied 
by moderate growth – due to the rise in interest rates may result in intolerable debt 
service burdens for the budget. Of course it is impossible to make accurate long-term 
predictions. And it was not even meant to be accurate. However, the baseline shows 
the rather dangerous outcome of what can happen if the current negative growth 
tendencies are not curbed, as this way Japan would rather sooner than later get into 
an economic situation that cannot be kept under control. 
OECD experts looked at two other scenarios in addition to the baseline one. 
In Scenario 1 the real growth was 1 per cent, just like in the baseline scenario, but 
infl ation was only 0.5 per cent, which is in fact a near-defl ation situation. This is pretty 
close to the real situation, as the current period is also characterised by similar values. 
In this case, the relatively low interest rates would result in small current account 
defi cit and even two per cent primary surplus after 2025. The gross government debt 
would take a sustained downward path, and by 2040 it could be 211.5 per cent of 
the GDP. This is a much more positive scenario; however, the achieving a primary 
balance surplus would require tax hikes and cutting expenditures drastically. And 
this is a quite diffi  cult task as an ageing society and increasingly wider and deeper 
social problems may force the government to increase such expenditures.7
7 The needs of the ageing population put increasingly greater pressure on the government to 
increase expenditures, including fi rst and foremost pensions, social care, and health care. In addition 
– in spite of the fact that the average income of Japanese households is quite high – because of the 
signifi cant diff erences in income, low-income families have diffi  culty making ends meet, while in 
1985 12 per cent of the population lived in relative poverty, in 2009 16 per cent of the population. 
Even around the turn of the millenium it was one of the highest rate among OECD countries. Of 
the developed economies – with the exception of the United States – it is Japan that has the biggest 
diff erence between the top and bottom 10 per cent of the population with regard to income. At the end 
of the fi rst decade of the new millennium the top 10 per cent earned only three or four times more than 
the bottom 10 per cent in the majority of European countries.
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The most promising is Scenario 2, whose values are the furthest from current 
Japanese reality. A two per cent real growth is accompanied by a two per cent infl ation 
here, meaning that the annual nominal GDP growth is four per cent. According to 
this optimistic scenario, the budget would improve gradually, and both the current 
account and primary balance would turn into large surplus. In the 15 years between 
2026 and 2040 the current account balance would have an average surplus of 4.5 per 
cent of the GDP while the primary balance would have a surplus equal to 6.8 per cent 
of the GDP. If all these came true, government debt would decrease steadily, and by 
2040 it would only slightly exceed the GDP. Currently this scenario does not seem to 
be very realistic, but it highlights the key importance of sustained economic growth.
The critical mass of structural reforms
Undoubtedly structural reforms are the most crucial of the three arrows, as it 
is only the reforms that can lay the foundations of long-term, sustained economic 
growth. As we have repeatedly stressed in this paper, the reasons behind Japan’s 
prolonged stagnation are the fundamental structural and institutional problems, 
which developed over the previous decades. The third arrow of Abenomics is actually 
aimed at transforming these structures. In the course of this the economic policy has 
run into insurmountable obstacles and diffi  culties. However, if encouraging progress 
is made, the globally competitive private sector can have signifi cant role instead of 
short-term state expansion and state intervention. Structural reforms are primarily 
aimed at boosting Japan's long-term growth potential. This in itself is of supreme 
importance, but it is also imperative for decreasing the extremely high public debt of 
Japan as well (IMF, 2012).
However, the current state and tendencies of Japanese economic growth are 
anything but encouraging. As Table 5 shows that following the economic miracle, 
by the 90s potential growth was just 1.9 per cent, and in the fi rst decade of the new 
millennium it was only 0.6 percent. And it continued to slump in the present decade. 
Currently the potential growth rate of Japan’s economy is estimated to be around 0.4 
per cent, which is the lowest in the developed world. The reason why real growth is 
so low is not the cyclical factors but rather fundamental institutional and structural 
ones. In its current position the economy of Japan will not be able to achieve higher 
level of growth sustainably (OECD, 2015d, p. 265, Hausman–Wieland, 2014, pp. 
9–13).




Annual growth rate of potential output between 1991 and 2017
1991–2000 2001–2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
United Kingdom 2.6 2.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.8
Finland 2.8 2.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7
France 2.1 1.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2
Ireland 7.2 4.6 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.6
Japan 1.9 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Germany 2.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3
Italy 1.6 0.7 –0.1 –0.3 –0.4 –0.3 –0.1 0.1 0.2
Switzerland 1.5 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4
Sweden 2.3 2.4 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8
United States of 
America
3.1 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7
Eurozone 2.2 1.6 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0
OECD average 2.8 2.1 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6
Source: OECD [2015d], p. 265 (2015–2017 forecast).
Drawing on experience and learning from failures, the most essential areas, 
measures and achievements of the third arrow of Abenomics, namely structural 
reforms can be organized into ten groups. Reviewing them can give us a good 
picture about the problems that underlie the quarter-of-a-century-long stagnation 
(OECD, 2015a, pp. 19–20, OECD, 2015b, pp. 231–234, IMF, 2015a, IMF, 2015b, pp. 
9–11, p. 28).
1. Developing corporate management culture and knowledge and promoting 
this through the fi nancial system. In order to achieve this the JPX-Nikkei 400 index 
was launched on January 6, 2014, setting stricter rules, greater transparency and 
controllability for major corporations.
2. The reform of governmental and quasi-governmental funds management. 
Starting from 2014 they have been encouraging them to increase the proportion of 
securities in their portfolios as well as the transformation of the management system.
3. Developing entrepreneurship and the corporate environment promoting it. As 
of 2014 the taxation and the regulatory environment has been much more favourable 
to business angels than before. In 2014 the creation of six special economic zones 
with more fl exible regulation was announced. These deregulation zones are to help 
double the import of foreign capital by 2020.
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5. Improving the scientifi c and technical conditions for innovation and making 
Japan the leading country in the robot revolution. Government resources for science 
and technology, which were dispersed before, have now been centralized. 
6. Tackling employment problems by helping women get a job and help them 
get promoted. The government increased kindergarten places by 400 thousand 
and school day care facilities by 300 thousand to make waiting lists shorter. The 
government believes that it was because of this measure that the employment rate of 
women grew by 3.9 per cent.
7. Facilitating fl exible working hours and promoting talents. The government 
prefers to provide support for job maintenance where there is fl exible job mobility. 
The government is determined to check and limit overtime. The government also 
wants to establish a system in which employees are paid according to performance 
rather than hours worked.
8. Attracting foreign talents to Japan, and provide them with facilities to use 
their talents. Foreign advisors and teachers who were given a three-year work permit 
can stay and work for another two years in Japan.
9. Powerful agricultural policy. The government would like to double the 
income of people working in agriculture, in a bid to promote economic growth. As 
of the fi scal year of 2013 the government decided to end its policy of limiting rice 
production for a fi ve-year period. 
10. Improving the quality of health care. The government would like to provide 
people eligible to state health care services with quick access to the latest approved 
medical treatments. They have set up a new institution to manage medical research 
and development.
As can be seen from the list, these are very general objectives and they cover 
the complete spectrum. All of them are aimed at promoting growth, eliminating 
bottlenecks and ironing out snags partly by increasing market competition and 
transparency and partly by overcoming labour problems. Promoting technical and 
technological development is also a key part of the reforms. However, when we 
look at the three years since Shinzo Abe has become prime minister, we see that 
the progress made has been slower than expected and planned originally. The key 
may be reforming the labour market and fully implementing measures off setting the 
labour shortage caused by demographic processes. In 2014 80 per cent of Japanese 
businesses reported that it was getting increasingly more diffi  cult for them to fi ll 
vacancies. In 2006 it was only 60 per cent of them who had such problems. In 2010 
Japan had a 66.3 million-strong workforce, which is to go down to 56.8 million by 
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2030. The working-age population of Japan who are between 15 and 64 years old is 
decreasing by one million every year, and it is predicted to go down by 40 percent by 
2050. The dependency ratio in Japan, which was 2.5 in 2013 will go down to 1.3 by 
2050, which is giving the biggest cause for concern among OECD countries (IMF, 
2015c; OECD, 2015a, pp. 21–23).
Women’s employment in Japan is quite low, only 38 percent of women stay on 
the labour market after giving birth. The labour market participation rate of men is 
85 percent, but that of women is nearly 20 percent point lower. If this latter were 
increased it would slow down the decline of working age population but not stop it 
altogether. The fact that the birth rate in Japan today is merely 1.4 percent, which 
implies further population decline as well as long-term demographic problems, is 
indicative of the gravity of the situation. By increasing the availability of nursery 
school, kindergarten and school day care facilities, and reducing or eliminating 
waiting lists the government would like to increase the number of women in the 
workforce as well as the number of births. In addition women’s wages, which are 
far below the wages of men, should be raised, and make it easier for women to 
get promoted at their workplace. However, the social conditions underlying the 
phenomenon cannot be changed easily, traditionally Japanese women have a much 
more subordinate role than women in countries rooted in European culture. So it 
does not seem easy to integrate them more into the labour force. 
Another – although much less substantial – internal resource could be the 
employment of the elderly. Compared to other developed countries the labour market 
participation of the elderly in Japan is already relatively high. The employment rate 
of people between 65 and 69 is 39 percent. However, if we look at the high life 
expectancy of Japanese people and how fi t the elderly are, they could be reintegrated 
into the labour market by implementing an appropriate incentive scheme. The 
situation is further complicated by the fact that in Japan, just like in other countries, 
there are very considerable regional diff erences, and there are great diff erences in the 
demography of the urban and the agricultural population in rural areas. 
Given the labour market and demographic situation the question arises naturally: 
should Japan increase immigration. In international comparison, because of its 
unique history and national characteristics immigration to Japan is quite low, they 
make up only 2 percent of the total labour force. It is extremely diffi  cult to bring 
about change in this area as well, especially since the tendency between 2009 and 
2013 was just the opposite. The net labour infl ux in this period decreased from 76 
thousand to less than its half, 35 thousand people. The 35 thousand foreign labourers 
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make up for less than 0.03 percent of the population. Mind you, the majority of 
them were highly qualifi ed professionals and consultants. In recent decades there 
have been a much larger number of foreign business people, often fl uent in Japanese 
and with extensive knowledge of the country, who chose to settle down here. The 
national strategic special zones are designed to facilitate the infl ux of skilled foreign 
labour in the future. For the time being we can say only that the immigration issue 
which was a taboo earlier is now something that is open for debate (IMF, 2015c, 
OECD, 2015a, pp. 21–23).
When the areas of reform were listed, the widespread use of cutting edge 
techniques and technology, developing innovation facilities, improving the quality 
of corporate management and competitiveness were mentioned as important factors 
that could contribute to economic growth. Numerous measures have been taken in 
the past decade in this direction, but the transformation of behavioural patterns, 
and the internalization of knowledge take a long time. One of the highest priority 
structural reforms of Abenomics is aimed at accelerating this process, understanding 
the dynamism and innovativeness of the business sector. In order to do this businesses 
have been encouraged to adopt more professional corporate management styles and 
drawing on international experience. Making it easier for foreign professionals to stay 
serves this end. In addition, as of January 2014 they made it possible for corporations 
to receive corporate tax credit in return for investment, which is expected to increase 
corporate investment. The above mentioned special economic zones also serve this 
purpose; these zones are places where they experiment with fl exible regulation, the 
optimal type of stronger deregulation, which can later be used in the whole economy. 
In order to strengthen the corporate sector it is absolutely essential to stabilise the 
fi nancial sector further. Major transformation is imperative in this sector as well, 
in order for the sector to become the driver of growth. Currently trading with 
government securities is still predominant, but for accelerated growth corporate 
lending needs to take over. 
The reform of the agriculture of Japan, which is still heavily subsidized, is of 
less signifi cance, but can be a dynamizing factor. As is the case with agriculture 
the competitiveness of those sectors of Japan’s dual economy that satisfy domestic 
demands is quite low. All this puts a heavy burden on the economy at the moment, 
using resources that would be needed in key export sectors. The Abe government 
plans to deregulate the agricultural, the energy, the environmental and the health 
care sectors, opening these markets to a wide range of private investors.
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Throughout its unique development the Japanese economy has always been 
insular, not letting the eff ects of global economy penetrate into the country. While 
export-oriented development supported by the state by all means played a crucial 
role in the exceptional dynamics of the country, numerous obstacles were placed 
by the governments to stop the infl ux of products and capital into the country. The 
inevitable opening of the global economy in the seventies and the eighties pointed 
out the internal structural and institutional weaknesses, but could not bring real 
change, so it contributed to the Great Stagnation. First and foremost because there 
was no real internal adaptation. If we look at the facts and fi gures we can see that 
Japanese economy is still insular. This is why the impact and outcome of joining the 
Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP) for Japan is double edged. Increased competition, 
the greater number of foreign investors may on the one hand force the country to 
implement much needed structural and institutional changes , but on the other hand, 
if these reforms are not progressing as they should, they may make the bad situation 
even worse. Not joining the TPP may have catastrophic consequences, so Japan 
along with 10 other countries8 from the region signed the treaty with the United 
States in February 2016, but the parliament still needs to ratify it. The fact that Japan 
was the last country to sign the treaty is very telling, Japan is aware of the double-
edged situation it creates for the country. If Japan did not join, it would just isolate 
the country even more, but its eff ect cannot be predicted at the moment (OECD, 
2015a, pp. 23–24, IMF, 2015c, pp. 78–80).
Quo vadis Japan?
The diverse measures taken by the Shinzo Abe government still have not 
coagulated into a solid reform programme. Although the Abenomics measures are 
very spectacular, their political communication is very powerful, but they may not 
achieve the set targets: halting the defl ation spiral and set the country on a sustained 
growth path. It is a very important sign regarding the future that the instruments 
used now are not without precedent, and when they were put to use earlier they did 
not produce sustained results either. Chances are a breakthrough can be achieved 
only if all the elements of the programme are fully implemented. If the targets are 
only partly achieved – and the structural and institutional reforms are especially 
critical in this respect – the second half of the decade will see stagnation or even 
8 Australia, Brunei, Chile, Canada, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, New Zealand, Singapore and 
Vietnam.
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worse, a decrease in real GDP instead of the growth planned (Hausman–Wieland, 
2014).
The task facing the Japanese government is quite diffi  cult after a crisis-ridden 
quarter of a century and – in spite of apparent similarities to other countries and 
regions – in many respects quite unique. What we have at hand is not simple fi nancial 
or cyclical crisis management. If this was the case, the actions required would be 
managing recession and issues caused by it, recovery and overcoming weaknesses, 
correcting errors after which the specifi c economy can get back on the dynamic 
growth path it had been on before. However, in Japan the majority of structural 
reforms have wanted to transform areas that developed and solidifi ed over many 
decades as well as formal and informal institutions, and their success is dubious. 
What we see here is the system crisis of a unique capitalist planned economy that has 
been operating for long decades.9
Expansive monetary and fi scal policy – at their best – can accelerate growth 
only temporarily. Long-term price changes, the rate of infl ation/defl ation are the 
results of deeper processes of the economy. However, both of these economic policy 
measures increased future risks signifi cantly. The quantitative expansion program 
implemented by the Bank of Japan, the near-zero infl ation rate, the sudden increase 
of the monetary base – in addition to the development of gigantic fi nancial bubbles 
– which may put a heavy burden on the balance of the central bank, which in turn 
will aff ect government balance. Government policies stimulating growth increased 
government debt even more, creating harsher and harsher conditions for the 
implementation of fi scal consolidation (Aoyagi–Ganelli–Murayama, 2015).
If we do not look deeper the instruments used in Japan can be compared to the 
crisis management measures taken in the United States after 2007–2009. However, 
the results are radically diff erent in the two economies. The United Sates is on an 
encouraging, upward path, while Japan’s agony continues. It serves as just another 
clear example that the success or failure of economic policies depends essentially on 
their interaction with the real economy, but also on the patterns of behaviour of the 
players of the national economy and the nature of informal institutions. When the 
main targets of monetary policy and the instruments used to achieve these targets in 
diff erent countries and regions are set and identifi ed a lot of considerations, interests, 
9 In this regard, in spite of the basic diff erences, in some sense we can compare the situation 
of Europe to that of serious task facing Japan. On our continent the welfare state, the so-called 
“European model”, which developed over long decades, is facing multiple challenges. And there are 
a lot of obstacles to the much-needed radical transformation, just like over there, but since the nature 
of problems is very diff erent we have to fi nd the way that suits us best separately (Muraközy, 2012).
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particularities are taken into account. All this goes far beyond making simplifi ed 
analogies based on similar features that appear in fi nancial techniques. After 
2007–2009 the overriding consideration was to keep the banking system shaken by 
the crisis alive and consolidate it, while in Japan it was breaking out of the spiral. 
Defl ation and stagnation are actually the visible symptoms of the crisis of the Japanese 
developmental state model. Whereas in the United States the latest fi nancial crisis 
was just another recession, after which growth can be continued. Japan has been 
mired in deep structural problems, writhing in the spider web of interacting formal 
and informal institutions for a quarter of a century, and it is still very uncertain 
whether the country knows how to get out of it. The model that helped the country 
catch up earlier, has by now become the hindrance to further development. In the 
case of Japan path dependence is extremely strong (Muraközy, 2016).
The European Central Bank has in recent years followed the practice of the 
United States of America, the United Kingdom and Japan in quantitative expansion, 
but the results are quite diff erent from those of these countries. The Eurozone is in a 
fundamentally diff erent situation than Japan or the United States. The one-size-fi ts-
all policy of the European Central Bank has very diff erent eff ects on countries that 
are independent from each other and are at diff erent levels of economic and social 
development. This example illustrates that we need to look beyond the instruments 
used in the measures taken by governments and central banks, and do more than 
simply identify the apparent similarities in fi scal policy. What determines the fi nal 
outcome tends to stay quite hidden. The nature of the economy and society, the 
underlying characteristics and traditions of countries and regions determine whether 
the measures taken will bring success or failure. Economic policy in itself has 
relatively little eff ect on them. Politicians often do not even assess – or do not care 
– how powerful the instruments in their hands are, instruments that can be used 
to improve the situation only a little even on the long term, but can make it a lot 
worse as well. It is true that, provided the instruments fi t, the timing is right, there is 
synergy and harmony, they can help to boost growth opportunities, and fi nd the right 
development path. However, it is also very easy to blunder in the complex network of 
economic, political and social relationships and make an inadequate assessment of 
the long-term consequences and eff ects (Korniyenko–Loukoinova, 2015). 
There has been constant crisis management in Japan since the early nineties, 
while the rest of the world was enjoying the prosperity of the Great Moderation. In 
this respect Japan, with its defl ation, economic stagnation and crisis management 
measures was ahead of its time, as it was before the years of recession in 2007–2009. 
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The attempts Japan made before and after the turn of the millennium were valuable 
lessons to economic policy makers in the United States as well as in Europe. But 
Shinzo Abe also drew on this experience when he formulated his “three arrows” 
policy. However, today Japan is not the only struggling country of global economy, 
the developed world and great developing economies display symptoms of crisis 
from Europe to the United States, China and Brazil. This, however, does not make 
the situation of Japan any easier, even if it has accumulated a wealth of experience. 
Japan has always taken its own course, and still is (Hoshi–Kashyap, 2015).
After the fi nancial crisis of the nineties, bursting the real estate bubble, numerous 
attempts were made in Japan to get the country off  the defl ation-stagnation course. 
The reform measures taken after the turn of the millennium yielded little results. 
Since the middle of the decade, during the second term of Shinzo Abe, the country 
has made an attempt based on bolder and more ambitious concepts than before. The 
“three arrows” policy – expansive monetary policy, fi scal stimulus and structural 
reforms – has not met the expectations so far. Monetary and fi scal policy in itself is 
not enough to change the underlying processes of the economy and society. For in 
Japan the problems are deeply rooted in these. Comprehensive structural reforms, 
the third arrow of Abenomics, may take us one step closer to an eff ective solution.
The appropriate transformation of formal institutions and structural reforms 
are of course necessary and can facilitate the operation of the market, since if the 
old conditions prevailed, they would prevent that. However, these only provide the 
boundary conditions. It is much more intensive market mechanisms that can get the 
country out of the ditch, but this takes market players who have the mentality, values 
and skills that match these market mechanisms. And this is necessary at all levels, 
at the level of employees, businesses, managers, fi nance and insurance professionals 
and consumers as well. For it is of primary importance how fl exible the economy 
and its players are, whether they are able to react to economic policy measures and 
market changes. What we also need to keep in mind is that a fi nancial crisis is very 
diff erent from a prolonged system crisis. 
However, even if we assume that things will turn out best, and the comprehensive 
reform of the formal fi nancial system is fully carried out, we still cannot be sure of 
success. For – and the long-term development of Japan provides us with plenty of 
evidence – all this is insuffi  cient to change and transform habits, customs, behavioural 
patterns, traditions, in other words, informal institutions. Even if this transformation 
is started after the reforms of formal institutions have been carried out, and using 
these as a framework, it will still take years to bring about fundamental changes. 
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Or – and this is just as likely – informal institutions will modify the operations of 
formal ones in a way that is undesirable. Currently we cannot tell whether Japan will 
continue to writhe in the dead-end street of sustained stagnation and lag behind, or 
– as we hope – will undergo radical transformation. 
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Populism versus Valid Dangers
TAMÁS DEZSŐ ZIEGLER
The provisions of the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), the major trade agreement between the EU and the US received serious 
criticism from the public, some NGOs and even some scholars. Disputes surrounding 
many of its special provisions got highly emotional, with extreme commentaries 
in the media. There is a high chance the conclusion of the deal will be blocked 
because of public opposition. This article tries to analyse four of the most important 
questions, namely the transparency of negotiations, the issue of investor-state dispute 
settlement, and the agreement’s eff ects on environment-sustainable development and 
regulatory issues/consumer standards. Based on the analysis, it concludes that even 
though TTIP may contain some serious pitfalls, there is a high chance it would not 
lead to the devastating results as is regularly portrayed, and most of the problematic 
points could be settled relatively easily.*
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: F1 Trade, K33 – International Law, K2 
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1. Introduction
The EU and the US are some of the major actors in international trade, and 
have a dynamic and intense relationship with each other. “The two sides account for 
nearly half of world gross domestic product (GDP), about 30% of global exports, and 
have investments of more than $3.7 trillion in each other’s economies.”1 More than 
half of the outgoing US foreign direct investment (FDI) is directed to Europe, and 
European investors represent nearly three-fourths of US FDI infl ow.2 About one-
third of EU FDI stems from the US.3 “In 2013, the share of exports to the United 
States in total extra EU-28 exports was 18.5 %, the share of imports from the United 
States in total extra EU-28 imports was, at 11.6 %, somewhat lower than exports.”4
Transatlantic cooperation in the fi eld of commerce and trade has a longer 
history: between 1994 and 1996, the EU and US planned to create a Transatlantic 
Free Trade Area, but negotiations stopped because of the newly founded WTO. An 
offi  cial framework of transatlantic cooperation was established by the Transatlantic 
Declaration (TD)5 in 1990 and fi ve years later with the New Transatlantic Agenda 
(NTA).6 After the NTA, many forms of so called “dialogues” had been established 
between the EU and the US to cooperate. Most of them were in connection with 
commercial and trade issues.7 Such dialogues are the Transatlantic Business Dialogue 
(1995), encouraging trade and cooperation in diff erent industrial sectors, which now 
includes a Transatlantic Business Council.8 Dialogues also involve the Transatlantic 
Consumer Dialogue (1998)9 and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP, 
1998) in the fi eld of trade and investment, and a Transatlantic Economic Council 
was also set up in 2007.10 There exists a Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue (TLD), 
establishing a formal annual dialogue between the European Parliament and the US 
  1 Akhtar et al [2014].
  2 Weiss, Martin A. – Akhtar, Shayerah Ilias – Murrill, Brandon J. – Shedd, Daniel T.: International 
Investment Agreements (IIAs): “Frequently Asked Questions.” Congressional Research Service 7-5700 
www.crs.gov R44015
  3 See: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/USA-EU_-_international_
trade_and_investment_statistics
  4 Ibid.
  5 See: https://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/trans_declaration_90_en.pdf
  6 See: https://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/new_transatlantic_agenda_en.pdf
  7 See: Porsdam [2009], pp. 63–64.
  8 See: Chase–Pelkmans [2015].
  9 Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue. See: http://tacd.org/?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1
10 Transatlantic Economic Council. See: http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/eu/tec/
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Congress (1999).11 Several other dialogues can be important as well, like the Trans-
Atlantic Environment Dialogue (TAED, 1999), which got suspended in 2000. Later, 
the EU-US High Level Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable 
Development was launched in 2006, and several meetings were held in 2006–2008, 
but no meetings were held after 2009.12 There also exists a Transatlantic Labour 
Dialogue (2001), and some other cooperative fora, like the EU-US Working Group 
on cybersecurity and cybercrimes (2010).13
The EU and the US started the negotiations on the conclusion of a Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in 2013. The aim of the TTIP is to connect 
these two regions, and create an international space by cutting most of the customs, 
and creating a more investor-friendly environment – partly through making joint 
eff orts in altering regulatory barriers.14 During the TTIP negotiations, there were 
protests all over Europe regularly. The biggest anti-TTIP demonstration was held 
in Berlin, where approximately 150–250,000 people went to the streets to protest 
against the agreement in August 2015. A European initiative was also started and 
3.28 million people signed the petition.15 In an EU level public consultation 150,000 
replies were received in 2014.16 
Regarding TTIP, a clash between worldviews is taking place. Critics of 
“neoliberal” “capitalism” got louder; attacks against international cooperation 
became harsher. The author of this article accepts the opinion that international 
cooperation is mostly benefi cial for the participant countries, but it may also contain 
some dangers, like a backlash against trade, or social disintegration.17 A kind of 
democratic dilemma also emerges: the more interconnected countries are, the less 
eff ect people will have on decision making, which becomes less democratic.18 This is 
especially true in the EU, which has 28 Member States. As Article 3 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states, the EU has exclusive competence 
11 See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/d-us/publications.html?tab=IPMs> 
12 Transatlantic Environment Dialogue suspended. See: http://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-
environment/news/transatlantic-environment-dialogue-suspended/
13 EU-US cooperation on cyber security and cyberspace. See: https://eeas.europa.eu/statements/
docs/2014/140326_01_en.pdf; “Fact Sheet: U.S.-EU Cyber Cooperation” (White House). See: https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-offi  ce/2014/03/26/fact-sheet-us-eu-cyber-cooperation
14 See: Hamilton–Pelkmans (eds.) [2015]. 
15 See: https://stop-ttip.org/
16 Online public consultation on investment protection and invest or-to-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP). Brussels, 13.1.2015 
SWD(2015) 3 fi nal. 
17 See: Rodrick [1997], p. 69. et seq.
18 See: Rodrick [2011], p. 120. et seq.
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in commercial policy. According to Article 216, it also has the right to conclude such 
agreements, instead of its Member States (“MSs”). However, in certain countries 
like Germany TTIP became very unpopular. The fact that the European Commission 
(“Commission”) has proposed the conclusion of a similar agreement with Canada 
(EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, “CETA”) as it would 
fall into shared competency with the MSs instead of exclusive EU competency19 also 
shows that this is a democratic dilemma. There is a high chance the Commission 
will use a similar procedure concerning the TTIP negotiations, which means that 
MSs will have to ratify the treaty, and some of them will probably hold referendums, 
which could block the entry into force of the agreement.
Consequently, in a number of countries people will probably decide whether 
they will give a green light to the agreement, which highlights the importance of the 
information they receive. In the following, the readers fi nd four of the most debated 
groups of problems regarding the present text of agreement: the case of transparency 
of negotiations, the general background of investor-state dispute settlement, and 
the agreement’s eff ect on environment-sustainable development and regulatory 
cooperation/consumer standards. The list is arbitrary: it is based on the points that 
received the harshest criticism in the European mainstream media or from NGOs/
academics. By analysing these problems, the paper tries to show whether mainstream 
claims regularly raised pro or contra the conclusion of the agreement are valid, partly 
valid or unfounded.
2. Transparency Issues
In this subchapter, this paper summarises the problems of transparency around 
TTIP, which has two main sub-problems: transparency during negotiations and 
transparency of research data about the possible results and benefi ts of such an 
agreement.
2.1. The Lack of Transparency of Negotiations
In the fi rst phase of negotiations on TTIP, transatlantic meetings were held 
behind closed doors from 2013. There were great protests in order to come to know 
the negotiation mandate. According to the general procedure of such negotiations in 
19 See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2371_en.htm
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the EU, in the fi rst period the public only came to know its summary. This process is 
similar to other negotiations on international agreements, but in this case it generated 
tensions. After the CJEU stressed the importance of transparency during negotiations 
in a case related to another international agreement and the European Ombudsman 
pressured the Council to publicise the mandate on TTIP,20 it was published after 
a long time with a strong delay in November 2014,21 and also additional materials 
got disclosed.22 The Commission tried to prove its commitment to transparency by 
regularly publishing materials.23 On the other hand, even now, the offi  cial European 
website24 of TTIP still does not give enough, proper and user friendly information 
for the public. 
As a result of the surrounding protests, the public support behind TTIP started 
to erode in certain countries. As a report of the Pew Research Center signalled, 
the number of those who are in favour of TTIP in Germany decreased from 55% 
to 41% between 2014 and mid 2015,25 while at the end of 2015 it reached a low 
of 35%, according to other polls,26 (Eurobarometer poll showed 39%, see below), 
and some statistics show the support of TTIP sank to 17% in Germany by the 
middle of 2016.27 In the US, support remained nearly the same (50-54%). However, 
Eurobarometer poll results from the beginning of 2016 still show that fi fty-eight per 
cent of EU citizens support the idea of TTIP, while a quarter are against it.28 In the 
US, negotiations were put onto a fast track procedure by the Congress.29 In this case, 
Congress may not modify the text, but can only accept or reject it, and the president 
20 See: Horváthy [2014], p. 19; Case C-350/12 P. Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 3 July 
2014. Council of the European Union v Sophie in ’t Veld. ECLI:EU:C:2014:2039
21 European Council Document 2014 (OR. En) 11103/13 DCL 1 WTO 139 Services 26 FDI 17 USA 
18 - ST 11103/13. 
22 See: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1477
23 The Commission publishes further TTIP documents in ongoing transparency commitment. 
See: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1477
24 See: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/
25 PEW: Decreasing Support for TTIP in Germany. See: http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/05/07/
germany-and-the-united-states-reliable-allies/u-s-germany-relations-06/
26 Bundesregierung will TTIP-Verhandlungen schon 2016 abschließen. See: http://
bundesdeutsche-zeitung.de/headlines/economy-headlines/bundesregierung-will-ttip-verhandlungen-
schon-2016-abschliessen-961156
27 Nur wenige Deutsche fi nden TTIP gut. See: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/ttip-und-
freihandel/nur-wenige-deutsche-fuer-freihandeslabkommen-ttip-mit-usa-14190518.html
28 Eurobarometer: who’s for and against TTIP in EU. See: http://www.borderlex.eu/eurobarometer-
whos-ttip-eu/
29 Palmer, Doug: US trade vote puts TTIP on faster track – President Barack Obama’s chief trade 
offi  cial vows to fi nish the European Union pact by next year. See: http://www.politico.eu/article/us-
trade-vote-ttip-obama/
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may negotiate relatively freely, but only according to the authority Congress has 
granted to him [trade promotion authority (TPA)]. This procedure is sporadically 
called unconstitutional, because it deprives Congress (esp. the Senate) of some of its 
rights.30 However, according to mainstream US scholars, Congress has the right to 
delegate some of its powers to the President.31 
2.2. Transparency of Research Data
The Commission estimated that the potential gains for the EU could be as up 
to €120bn a year and €95bn for the US, which equals 0.5% of EU GDP and 0.4% of 
US GDP. 32 Wages would also become higher: by 0.5% in the EU and 0.4% in the 
US. These numbers are based on a report by the London based Centre for Economic 
Policy Research.33 The same report also mentions that it would create several million 
jobs and consumers would enjoy cheaper products and services. It also says that 
average European households would gain around €500 a year as a consequence of 
wage increases and price reductions. Several other studies support the view that 
TTIP would be benefi cial, including the analysis of the World Trade Institute.34 A 
study of the Bertelsmann Stiftung claims that
“[a] deep liberalization will create about 181,000 new jobs in Germany, 
and more than a million in the USA. The total amount shows a growth in 
employment in all OECD countries of more than 2 million jobs; in the less 
ambitious tariff  scenario, about half a million.”35 
Some other studies also contained optimistic prognosis.36
30 Zuesse [2015]; Fein, Bruce–Grayson, Alan: The “Fast Track” Trade Bill Assaults the 
Constitution. Huntington Post. See: http://www.huffi  ngtonpost.com/rep-alan-grayson/the-fast-track-
trade-bill_b_7643656.htm
31 “So long as Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the 
person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative 
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” Wright [2004], p. 998. See also Shapiro 
[2006], Shapiro–Brainard [2001]. 
32 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The Economic Analysis Explained. 
September 2013. See: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/september/tradoc_151787.pdf
33 CEPR [2013]. 
34 World Trade Institute: TTIP And The EU Member States. The World Trade Institute, Bern, 
2016.01, pp. 9–46. See: http://www.wti.org/media/fi ler_public/03/b8/03b803d4-e200-4841-9c58-
f6612f4a7316/ttip_report_def.pdf
35 Felbermayr et al. [2013], p. 40.
36 Berden et al. [2009].
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On the other hand, criticism was also raised. Joseph Stiglitz expressed his views 
that UK could be better off  leaving the EU if TTIP passes.37 He described TTIP as “a 
massive rewriting of the rules with no public discussion”. 
Jørgen Steen Nielsen claims that the 
“Transatlantic Treaty on Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU 
and USA will not increase GDP, exports or employment as claimed by the 
EU Commission, the Danish government and the Confederation of Danish 
Industry. On the contrary, the so-called TTIP could lead to losses on all 
three accounts, especially in Northern European countries like Denmark.”38
Jeronim Capaldo claims TTIP could lead to a contraction of GDP, personal 
incomes, employment, and to European disintegration.39 
The Austrian Foundation for Development Research claims the methodology 
of supporting studies are based on unrealistic and fl awed assumptions and that 
TTIP’s social costs could be high and have been completely neglected in the impact 
assessments.40
TTIP could also have serious constitutional implications: as Anne Meuwese 
points it out, it may erode the Commission’s right to initiate legislation. Moreover, it 
may aff ect EU MSs rights and their sovereignty.41
Between supporters and critical voices a collision of worldviews takes place 
already mentioned in the introduction of this paper. Some scholars generally support 
market liberalism, while others reject it and fi nd such rules harmful. Both sides can 
collect arguments to support their views. At the present time, most of the European 
public still supports TTIP. However, in order to reach benefi cial arrangements, 
criticism and offi  cial data received from diverse sources must be discussed openly, 
in a democratic way. If some of the criticism is well founded, the text should be 
modifi ed accordingly. The European website of TTIP is not able to fulfi l this purpose, 
as its architecture and data are too complex and ill-organised, even for scholars. 
Moreover, the access to texts is also highly problematic, and we need far more 
analysis presented in a simple manner, also in connection with certain special topics. 
Based on the above, we can ascertain that we did not have proper public discussion 
about the potential eff ects of TTIP, which would highlight diff erent opinions, and the 
37 See: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/eu-referendum-joseph-stiglitz-ttip-
labour-transatlantic-trade-investment-partnership-a6907806.html
38 See: https://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/news/InformationAdverseEff ectsTTIP_Nov2014.pdf
39 Capaldo [2014]. 
40 Raza et al. [2014] 
41 Meuwese [2015], p. 171.
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reasons behind them. This could be striking knowing that the interests of countries 
could diff er within the EU. It would be good to receive more offi  cial data about each 
and every country. For example, Hungary’s situation is signifi cantly diff erent from 
other countries like Belgium or the UK. 
3. Investor-State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”)
3.1. General remarks
Concluding international treaties including bilateral protection of investors is 
very common in international relationships. About three thousand international 
investment agreements exist worldwide; most of them allow investors to bring 
actions against states. Some claim that such treaties are only useful for developed 
states.42 However, this is not true: “intra-South BITs continue to grow and now 
exceed 1,000”.43 There are more than a thousand bilateral investor treaties (“BITs”) 
adopted by EU MSs already existing. After the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
fate of these BITs became uncertain, since international investor protection became 
an integrated part of EU commercial policy.  As a result, the EU even adopted a 
regulation on their status allowing Member States to maintain them in 2012 
(however, EU MSs have also concluded about 170 BITs among themselves earlier, 
which, at present time, are contrary to EU law44). The reason for concluding such 
treaties is that states try to ensure the rights of related businesses even abroad. As a 
result of their power, states are always in a position to be able to harm the affi  liates 
of foreign companies or discriminate against them in their territory. The US has 
concluded such treaties with EU MSs Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic/Slovakia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Romania.
One of the cardinal issues regarding TTIP is the investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) mechanism of the agreement. It seems the text would include a clause that 
could create a special court for state-investor disputes: a mechanism for disputes 
42 Kleinheisterkamp [2014] p. 1.
43 Brower–Blanchar [2014], p. 50.
44 Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States 
and third countries. OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 40-46. ; Commission asks Member States to terminate 
their intra-EU bilateral investment treaties. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5198_en.htm
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between states and businesses.45 Using an external court is absolutely common in 
international commerce, and modern agreements on investor protection “usually 
contain specifi c ISDS provisions to provide a forum ensuring host states uphold 
public treaties with regard to international investments for investors from a home 
state”.46. All of the treaties on investor protection concluded by EU states with the 
US contain such clauses. Even though the German government supports the talks on 
TTIP, it also expressed its view that the ISDS is not acceptable, and Germany has 
formed an alliance with France against its implementation into the fi nal text.47
The number of investor-state related cases is growing worldwide (in 2012 there 
were 58 new cases,48 in 2014 42, while altogether nearly 600 of such cases were 
reported).49 However, there are also some sporadical, but still worrying developments: 
“in June 2011, Philip Morris initiated arbitration proceedings against 
Australia under the Australia – Hong Kong BIT, claiming that Australia’s 
plain packaging legislation violated investment standards under that 
agreement and had caused Philip Morris to incur a one billion dollar loss. 
Philip Morris has a similar claim pending against Uruguay under the 
Switzerland-Uruguay BIT.”50
However, the claims of Phillip Morris were dismissed based on the lack of 
jurisdiction (see later).
In another case (see Vattenfall II below), Germany was sued because of its intent 
to abolish the usage of atomic energy. Some other cases were raised as well (see the 
next subchapter) and the ISDS was regularly portrayed in the media as a harmful, 
dangerous system.
45 Concept Paper: Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform. Enhancing the right to 
regulate and moving from current ad hoc arbitration towards an Investment Court. See: http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF
46 Weaver [2014], p. 228.
47 France and Germany to form united front against ISDS. See: http://www.euractiv.com/section/
trade-society/news/france-and-germany-to-form-united-front-against-isds/
48 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad), IIA Issue Note, “Recent 
developments in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)”. May 2013.
49 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad), IIa Issue Note, “Investor-
State Dispute Settlement: Review Of Developments In 2014”. No. 2, 2015.
50 Lenk [2015]. 
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As an answer to the criticism, the Commission made amendments to the draft 
text on ISDS at the end of 2015. According to the related press release, they would 
create a new court system, which
“[i]ncludes major improvements such as:
 – a public Investment Court System composed of a fi rst instance Tribunal 
and an Appeal Tribunal would be set up;
 – judgements would be made by publicly appointed judges with high 
qualifi cations, comparable to those required for the members of 
permanent international courts such as the International Court of 
Justice and the WTO Appellate Body;
 – the new Appeal Tribunal would be operating on similar principles to the 
WTO Appellate Body;
 – the ability of investors to take a case before the Tribunal would be 
precisely defi ned and limited to cases such as targeted discrimination 
on the base of gender, race or religion, or nationality, expropriation 
without compensation, or denial of justice;
 – governments’ right to regulate would be enshrined and guaranteed in 
the provisions of the trade and investment agreements.” 51
3.2. Criticism
Below, we try to collect the most important critique this system received. As a 
central argument, it is raised that 
“both the US and the EU have highly evolved, effi  cient rule of law legal 
systems. There is no evidence that investors have ever lacked appropriate 
legal protection through these systems. There is no bilateral investment 
treaty between the US and any of the old EU MSs, and yet US and EU 
investors already make up for more than half of foreign direct investment 
in each others’ economies. This demonstrates that investors seem to be 
satisfi ed with the rule of law on both sides of the Atlantic.”52
However, the author of the present article is very sceptical regarding this 
statement. In recent years, the frameworks of the single market got shaky all over 
51 Commission proposes new Investment Court System for TTIP and other EU trade and 
investment negotiations. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5651_en.htm
52 Gerstetter–Meyer-Ohlendorf [2013], p. 4.
Külg 3-4.indb   28 2016.12.06.   11:22:07
LEGAL SUPPLEMENT • 2016/2 29
TTIP and Its Public Criticism: Anti-Globalist Populism versus Valid Dangers
Europe.53 In a number of countries like in Hungary, an institutionalised system was 
established, which openly discriminates against foreign investors, and the answers 
by the EU were only part solutions to the problems – in certain instances we could 
not fi nd proper solutions to issues raised 5-6 years ago.54 The number of related cases 
were growing,55 just like the number of cases related to Hungary (14 procedures 
recently)56 before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 
The US even banned the head of the Hungarian Tax Authority from entering the US, 
because (according to claims) she was involved in corruption, which had a negative 
eff ect on American companies in the local vegetable oil market.57 If discriminative 
actions are institutionalised as laws, domestic courts do not apply the international 
treaty, and would interpret the state’s sovereignty to have been infringed by them. 
As populism rises within the EU, there is a chance several countries could move into 
this direction. 
From a European perspective, it is a key factor whether EU companies could rely 
on TTIP before courts in the US. The main question is whether courts can enforce 
an agreement like TTIP without a system of ISDS. The enforcement of international 
agreements is highly problematic in the US, partly because of the existence of state-
federal levels and the hostility against applying them. Jan Kleinheisterkamp claims 
53 Hojnik [2012]. 
54 Ziegler [2012]; Ziegler [2016]. 
55 Perhaps the best example of such actions has been the government openly expressing its desire 
for foreign banks to leave the country and it also introduced special taxes on banks. The head of the 
Central Bank (the former minister of fi nance) also announced that he believes four major banks should 
leave the country in 15 years. Only to mention a few other cases, see Case C-385/12: Judgment of the 
Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 February 2014 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Székesfehérvári 
Törvényszék — Hungary), Hervis Sport- és Divatkereskedelmi Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal 
Közép-dunántúli Regionális Adó Főigazgatósága. OJ C 93, 29.3.2014, p. 10; Internal Market: the 
Commission has brought Hungary before the Court of Justice to contest restrictive conditions on the 
issue of luncheon vouchers and other benefi ts in kind. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-578_
en.htm; Commission opens new infringement procedure against Hungary. See: http://freehungary.hu/
index.php/56-hirek/2832-commission-opens-new-infringement-procedure-against-hungary; State aid: 
Commission opens two in-depth investigations into Hungary's food chain inspection fee and tax on 
tobacco sales. IP/15/5375; See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5375_en.htm; http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-578_en.htm?locale=FR; Commission opens infringement procedure 





56 Hungary – as respondent State. http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/
CountryCases/94?partyRole=2
57 Hungary’s top tax auditor in corruption scandal. https://english.atlatszo.hu/2014/11/25/
hungarys-top-tax-auditor-in-corruption-scandal/
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there is no evidence that this would be the case concerning TTIP, even though the 
Commission cited some recent case law, which proves the opposite.58 Moreover, it 
was put in the Medellin case in the US that
“even when treaties are self-executing in the sense that they create federal 
law, the background presumption is that international agreements, even 
those directly benefi ting private persons, generally do not create private 
rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts.”59
As Saadia M. Pekkanen puts it
“the territorial-democratic principle comes closer to the nationalist 
jurisprudence end of the spectrum, not because judges or adjudicators 
are always so consistently and militantly ideological in their commitments 
[…]”, but rather because “the real disinclination by judges to invoke, apply, 
or even just grapple with international law comes from the fact that it is 
physically external to the national territory and that it is also apparently 
unaccountable to a transparent democratic processes – twin elements which 
make international law, whether in trade or otherwise, less palatable to 
courts that are used to operating in familiar constitutional and electoral 
settings in the domestic arena.”60 
US exceptionalism can also be noticed in the fact that the country uses a great 
amount of reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) that ensure that 
the given agreements are not self-executing (i.e. have no direct eff ect).61
Moreover, as Gráinne de Búrca62 puts it, even the Supreme Court supports a 
highly restrictive stance towards the enforceability of international agreements.63 
The US Supreme Court dealt with international treaties in 15 cases between 2002–
58 Kleinheisterkamp [2014], Van Harten [2015], p. 29. et seq.
59 The Medellin judgment (footonote 3) cites 2 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States §907, Comment a, p. 395 (1986). It also adds that 
“accordingly, a number of the Courts of Appeals have presumed that treaties do not create 
privately enforceable rights in the absence of express language to the contrary. See, e.g., 
United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F. 3d 377, 389 (CA6 2001); United States v. Jimenez Nava, 
243 F. 3d 192, 195 (CA5 2001); United States v. Li, 206 F. 3d 56, 60–61 (CA1 2000) (en 
banc); Goldstar (Panama) S. A. v. United States, 967 F. 2d 965, 968 (CA4 1992); Canadian 
Transp. Co. v. United States, 663 F. 2d 1081, 1092 (CADC 1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. 
Congoleum Corp., 595 F. 2d 1287, 1298 (CA3 1979).”
60 Pekkanen. 
61 Goldsmith [1998], Bradley–Goldsmith [2000]; Bradley [2010], Mark [2009] Ray [2003]. 
62 de Búrca [2014].
63 Ibid, p. 11.
Külg 3-4.indb   30 2016.12.06.   11:22:07
LEGAL SUPPLEMENT • 2016/2 31
TTIP and Its Public Criticism: Anti-Globalist Populism versus Valid Dangers
2012.64 Of these, it addressed the direct enforceability or self-execution of treaties 
in 2 cases, and it denied the direct enforcement in both of these cases. In the US, 
NAFTA is also not provided with self-execution (just like the GATT or WTO 
agreements in Europe).65 However, investment treaties mostly seem to have a self-
executory character.66 These facts seem to prove the resistance of US domestic courts 
to applying “foreign” law, and based on the above, ISDS could be a solution to this 
problem (even if the enforcement of such awards can sometimes be problematic).67 
Consequently, we must admit that the enforceability of TTIP can be seriously 
questioned by regular courts, and the Supreme Court is not better in this regard.
Opponents of TTIP in Europe also claim that consumers would not be defended 
against investors, and such a system would create an imbalance in favour of 
investors. However, consumers could sue investors just like earlier, before national 
courts. This means that their rights would not be harmed by the procedural issues. It 
is a diff erent question whether the acceptance of lower consumer standards (i.e. the 
modifi cation of substantive law) is necessary or not (this could be really harmful) – 
but this question has less to do with the procedural issues (see later).
It is also regularly claimed that investors mostly win their cases before the 
investor-state arbitrational courts. However, a very simple search in ICSID’s statistics 
proves this claim is not true. Around 45% of investor claims were upheld and nearly 
30% were found unfounded.68 Regarding EU MSs,
“specifi c data from ICSID … shows the following fi gures for disputes against 
EU MSs:
 – In 44% of the cases, all claims were dismissed or jurisdiction was 
declined;
 – In 36% of the cases, the dispute was settled or otherwise discontinued;
 – In 20% of the cases, the dispute led to an award upholding claims in 
part of in full.”69
64 Ibid, p. 19.
65 Errico [2011], p. 179. et seq.
66 Yimer et al. [2011], p. 54.
67 King & Spalding, Recent Decisions Illustrate Disagreement Among U.S. Courts in Enforcing 
ICSID Awards. August 19, 2015, See: http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/
publication/ca081915b.pdf
68 The ICSID Caseload – Statistics. See: https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/
Pages/ICSID-Caseload-Statistics.aspx
69 Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). Some facts and fi gures. See: http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153046.pdf
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Furthermore, even if this ratio would be diff erent, suggesting that a higher number 
of successful investor claims must be a consequence of impartial judges70 seems to 
be unfounded: what if investors were really not treated properly by the governments? 
A very similar claim regularly raised in the online media is that only because 
arbitrators earn well, they could be biased, which is also based on demagoguery, and 
shows a lack of knowing how international arbitration works. However, allowing 
judges to proceed as counsels at the same court in diff erent cases would raise serious 
questions. The present text of TTIP answers this problem. Firstly, it would create a 
permanent court of  BIT disputes. Judges of the court would be delegated: fi ve by the 
US, fi ve by the EU and fi ve by third countries. The allocation of cases among them 
would be randomized. Secondly, beside the shady ethical requirements,71 Article 
11(1) of the latest Proposal of the Commission sets up very strict rules on the confl ict 
of interests of judges: it excludes them from acting in any other investor-state dispute, 
whether as judge or counsel, even before domestic courts. 72 Article 8.30 of CETA 
also contains a similar rule, without reference to domestic courts.73 
3.3. A “Lighter” Version of ISDS
A solution for a compromise would be to grant States infl uence in arbitration by 
allowing regular courts to overrule judgments. The German government proposed 
a similar solution. However, the author of this article would strongly discourage its 
usage. As Brower and Blanchard put it,
“recent proposals to reform investment arbitration by increasing States’ 
political control over the arbitral process would undermine the credibility 
of investment arbitration as a neutral method of resolving a dispute between 
an alien investor and a host State. Allowing States to interfere with arbitral 
decision making after a dispute arises would thus weaken the eff ectiveness of 
the system of foreign investor protection for stimulating international capital 
fl ows and promoting economic development. Moreover, the criticisms of 
70 Investor-state dispute settlement. The arbitration game. Governments are souring on treaties 
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investment treaties and arbitration that are invoked to justify politicization 
are based on emotion rather than on facts.”74
This solution would force businesses to long-term litigation, which could be used 
as a tactic by governments to make them leave a country. 
3.4. Preliminary Findings
When talking about the TTIP’s court system, we can have doubts whether the 
people’s trust in their governments is more reliable than trust in independent courts, 
who decide on professional grounds in hundreds of cases worldwide. If TTIP contains 
a danger, it cannot be found in the special court system, but in other provisions, like 
those on environment or consumer law, or on its economic eff ect on poorer MSs.
However, the creation of ISDS could hurt the independence of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”). Regarding the EU’s access to the European 
Convention on Human Rights,75 the CJEU mentioned that the outsourcing of the 
judicial powers is against the primary legal sources of the EU. A similar problem 
can occur regarding TTIP. This could be one reason why there is a need to sign 
the agreement on shared competency (just like in the case of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea or the WTO agreement): only MSs have the right 
to select a new court to judge over them, and the EU does not have power in this 
regard. This problem could be cured by some technical provisions, which gave power 
to the CJEU to fi rst decide whether the decision falls under MS or EU jurisdiction, 
like it is done concerning the CETA.76 We must mention that some commentators 
have started to write about the unconstitutionality of a pact like TTIP (Trans-Pacifi c 
Partnership, “TPP”), based on similar grounds in the US as well.77
4. Environment and Sustainable Development 
As mentioned before, the EU and the US already created a Transatlantic 
Environment Dialogue (“TAED”) in 1999 to discuss environment related issues, 
74 Brower–Blanchar [2014], p. 50.
75 Opinion 2/13 OF THE COURT (Full Court), 18 December 2014. ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
76 See: https://polcms.secure.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/49daf369-5480-40d7-aa8d-
df745c4ff 98c/SJ-0259-16_legal_opinion.pdf, point 81.
77 Is the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership Unconstitutional? See: http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2015/06/tpp-isds-constitution/396389/
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which got suspended because the US government failed to supply its share of funding 
in 2000.78 Later, the EU-US High Level Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy 
and Sustainable Development was launched in 2006, and several meetings were held 
in 2006-2008, but no meetings were held after 2009.
Environmental protection in trade also has background rules in EU primary legal 
sources. Article 191 TFEU serves as a general basis for environmental protection. 
It mentions that the EU’s environmental policy shall contribute to preserving, 
protecting and improving the quality of the environment, protecting human health, 
prudent and rational utilization of natural resources as well as to promoting measures 
to deal with regional and worldwide environmental problems. It also claims that 
Union policy must take into account the diversity of situations in the various regions 
of the Union. Based on these fundaments, a great set of legal materials emerged in 
the last decades.79
The EU must maintain its high environmental standards even towards outside 
actors: in this sense, internal market rules, domestic rules and international agreements 
interact with each other.80 Below, we analyse the most important environment related 
problems regarding TTIP.
4.1. Environment-Friendly Changes in a Legal System Hurting – Foreign – 
Investors in the Country
Firstly, according to the general claim in the media, an environment-friendly 
change in a legal system could force the state to pay a fee to compensate a company 
for damages caused by new regulations. Critics also bring up several examples 
of this.81 For example, in the Vattenfall I and Vattenfall II82 cases, the liability of 
Germany came into question. Germany introduced a new law on licensing of a new 
coal-fi red power plant in Hamburg-Moorburg: the Swedish company sued the state, 
and the case was settled: the German state lowered its standards and agreed to a 
less stringent license. In Vattenfall II, Germany decided to abolish its nuclear plants 
by 2022. 83 Vattenfall demanded compensation of €3.7 billion, because the change 
78 Transatlantic Environment Dialogue suspended. See: http://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-
environment/news/transatlantic-environment-dialogue-suspended/
79 Jans–Vedder [2012]. 
80 Durán–Morgera [2012], p. 13.
81 See: Gerstetter–Meyer-Ohlendorf [2013], p. 11.; Bernasconi-Osterwalder–Johnson [2010].
82 See: Bernasconi-Osterwalder–Hoff man [2012].
83 See: Bernasconi-Osterwalder–Brauch [2014].
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could eff ect the Energy Charter as well as an international agreement on investor 
protection: the case is still pending. However, existing case law is contradictory. In a 
number of cases84 like Santa Elena v. Costa Rica85 states had to pay compensation for 
their actions. In Metalclad v. Mexico86 the state had to pay because of a local decision 
to shut down an industrial toxic waste site of a company that was supported by the 
federal government. Several other cases could be mentioned, in which states were 
obliged to pay compensation.87 
In one of the latest cases between Phillip Morris and Australia on tobacco plain 
packaging, the decision held that
“the Tribunal found that it had no choice but to conclude the arbitration 
was an abuse of rights as Claimant’s corporate restructure was undertaken 
for the principal, if not the sole, purpose of gaining protection [...] when 
a dispute was not only reasonably foreseeable, but actually foreseen by 
Claimant.”88
In others cases like Methanex v. USA89 or Glamis Gold Ltd vs. United States90 
courts held that compensation is not necessary. 
The combination of environmental rules with ISDS is criticised especially 
harshly. Some claim that the inclusion of rules on ISDS 
“[i]n TTIP would not automatically mean that the US and the EU would be 
unable to adopt environmental measures in the future or would have to pay 
compensation to investors whenever doing so; however, the outcome of ISDS 
proceedings is rather unpredictable – the case law so far is inconsistent. 
Decisions from some cases have been quite restrictive of governments’ 
regulatory freedom. These uncertainties result in considerable risks which 
84 See: Gerstetter–Meyer-Ohlendorf [2013], p. 11. et seq.
85 ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1Santa Elena v. Costa Rica. Compañía Del Desarrollo De Santa Elena, 
S.A. And The Republic Of Costa Rica. See: http://www.italaw.com/documents/santaelena_award.pdf
86 ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States. See: 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/MetacladAward-English.pdf
87 See: Gerstetter–Meyer-Ohlendorf [2013]. See also: http://www.elstel.org/ISDS.html.en, or 
http://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/fi les/foee_factsheet_isds_oct13.pdf (p.7.)
88 Kofman–Williams [2015].
89 Methanex Corporation v. USA. See: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/fi les/case-documents/
ita0529.pdf
90 ICSID Case No Glamis Gold Ltd vs. United States. See: http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/125798.pdf; Obadia [2009].
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are exacerbated by the fact that investment-related provisions tend to be 
interpreted broadly in ISDS proceedings.”91
However, we have opposing views about this problem. As Brower and Blanchar 
put it,
“[m]uch criticism in this vein has focused on the possibility that investor-State 
arbitration could prevent States from enacting legitimate environmental 
regulation. However, actual arbitral awards addressing environmental 
issues demonstrate great deference to environmental policy. Contrary to 
critics’ claims, BITs do not give investors the right to sue a host State any 
time an investment is merely “interfered with” or the right to “demand 
compensation when a government-initiated change lowers the value of their 
assets.” Instead, a typical investment treaty guarantees that the host State 
will not discriminate against foreign investors and their investments, will 
treat them fairly and equitably, will refrain from expropriating without 
prescribed compensation, and will provide full protection and security. 
Those guarantees stop far short of promising that the State will not change 
the law or regulate the environment.”92 
They also claim that in most of the cases in which tribunals held a state liable, the 
environmental rationale was pretextual or against good faith, or government offi  cials 
clearly violated domestic law.93 
4.2. The Need for Strong Guarantees
According to the offi  cial position paper94 and a leaked draft on trade and 
sustainable development,95 at present it seems the TTIP would include some general 
provisions on states’ rights to protect environment and modify their laws. Article 3 
of the leaked Section I on trade and sustainable development states that
91 Obadia [2009], p. 4.
92 Brower–Blanchar [2014], p. 53. et seq.
93 “Investment tribunals have found States liable for pretextually environmental measures in 
only three cases, and in each case the tribunal concluded that based on the evidence the purportedly 
environmental action was not taken in good faith or in accordance with domestic law.” P. 55 thereof.
94 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – Trade in services, investment and e-commerce 
– Chapter II – Investment. See: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/september/tradoc_153807.
pdf
95 European Commission Brussels, 29 September 2015 Trade 34/2015 Note for the attention of 
the Trade Policy Committee Subject: TTIP – Draft EU textual proposal for a Chapter on Trade and 
Sustainable Development. See: https://www.scribd.com/doc/286658269/EU-SD-Proposal-TTIP
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“the Parties recognise the right of each Party to determine its sustainable 
development policies and priorities, to set and regulate its levels of domestic 
labour and environmental protection, and to adopt or modify relevant 
policies and laws accordingly. The right to regulate shall be exerted in 
a manner not inconsistent with the international labour standards and 
agreements referred to in Article … [Multilateral labour standards and 
agreements] and the environmental agreements referred to in Article … 
[Multilateral environmental governance and agreements].
2. Each Party shall ensure that its domestic policies and laws provide for 
and encourage high levels of protection in the labour and environmental 
areas and shall strive to continue to improve those policies and laws and 
their underlying levels of protection.”
Several commentators mention96 that the language of this text is vague, especially, 
if we compare it to the compensation part, which does not mention any changes in 
environmental legislation. As it puts it in Art. 18 
“the Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to weaken or reduce the levels 
of protection aff orded in domestic environmental or labour laws in order to 
encourage, or in a manner aff ecting, trade or investment.”
We must agree with those who claim that clearer and more straightforward 
language would be more useful to maintain the rights of EU states to keep and 
introduce environmental regulations they wish to protect nature, and ensure that 
the EU and the US do not weaken environmental protection to attract investment. 
Otherwise, the agreement can eff ectively endanger environmental protection in 
Europe.
4.3. Animal Rights
Another major claim regarding TTIP was that according to criticism, it would 
allow foreign companies to test cosmetics on animals, even though it is set out in 
Article 11 TFEU that environmental protection requirements must be integrated into 
EU policies and activities. As Article 13 TFEU puts it,
“in formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture, fi sheries, 
transport, internal market, research and technological development and 
96 See: https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/fi les/eu-us_trade_deal/2015/sustainable_
development_proposal_analysis_261015.pdf
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space policies, the Union and the MSs shall, since animals are sentient beings, 
pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the 
legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the MSs relating in 
particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.”
Consequently, animal welfare is accepted as a basic principle of EU law. TFEU 
also says in Article 36 that “MSs may introduce measures on the prohibitions or 
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justifi ed on grounds of public 
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of 
humans, animals or plants”, and that such measures are exempt from the prohibition 
of introducing quantitative restrictions among MSs. Critics claim that TTIP would 
break through these rules. The Draft on Sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) 
of TTIP mentions in its Article 17 that “Parties recognise that animals are sentient 
beings” and that 
“the Parties undertake to exchange information, expertise and experiences 
in the fi eld of animal welfare with the aim to align regulatory standards 
related to breeding, holding, handling, transportation and slaughter of farm 
animals.”97
We agree with those views that claim this text seems weak,98 since it does not 
tell us anything about the use of animals for testing, which is a key issue. As Keith 
Taylor, a Green MEP put it regarding the EU directive limiting scientifi c testing 
on animals99 (i.e. replacing, reducing, or refi ning the use of animals for scientifi c 
purposes or experimentation),
“Directive 2010/63/EU on the protection of animals used for scientifi c 
purposes represents the most advanced legislation of its kind in the world, 
and highlights the need for a review of US legislation in order to ensure 
that modern standards of animal protection are applied. The EU Directive 
is wider in scope than the US equivalent, covering all vertebrate and some 
invertebrate species, whereas in the US birds, fi sh, rats and mice (which 
97 See: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153026.pdf
98 How TTIP undermines food safety and animal welfare. Institute for Agriculture and trade 
policy, Friends of the Earth Europe. See: http://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/fi les/briefi ng_ttip_
food_safety_feb2015.pdf
99 Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010 on 
the protection of animals used for scientifi c purposes Text with EEA relevance. OJ L 276, 20.10.2010, 
p. 33–79.
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are the most frequently used species in scientifi c studies) are specifi cally 
excluded from protection in US legislation.
Moreover, EU Regulation 1223/2009 bans animal testing for cosmetics 
within the EU, as well as the sale within Europe of beauty products subjected 
to new animal testing for cosmetic purposes after 11th March 2013.”100
The Commission published some additional documents regarding this issue.101 
It is said that the EU’s goal is to “agree to work on alternative methods to animal 
testing and to push for the progressive phase-out of animal tests worldwide.”102 It is 
also set out that the EU’s aim is to reduce diverging requirements, which could also 
be useful because 
“a wider range of cosmetics products would be available to the consumer, 
testing would be more effi  cient and international harmonisation of cosmetics 
regulations and practices would be greater.”
This would be achieved “without compromising the protection of public policy 
interests such as health or animal welfare”.103 The text also mentions that “both 
Parties could agree on further fostering the development of alternative methods to 
replace animal testing.”104 
4.4. Preliminary Findings
Even though the respectable aims behind the eff orts on environment protection 
can be accepted, they seem to be vaguely worded in order to protect environment 
properly in both of the above-mentioned cases. It also seems that rules on core issues 








104 See point 2.3. thereof.
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5. Regulatory Cooperation and Consumer Standards
5.1. General background
Consumer protection has a stable background in EU primary legal sources, and 
a great material was built upon these provisions. Article 114 of TFEU says on the 
single market that 
“the Commission, in its proposals… concerning health, safety, environmental 
protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of 
protection, taking account in particular of any new development based on 
scientifi c facts. Within their respective powers, the European Parliament 
and the Council will also seek to achieve this objective.”
Article 169 also stresses that 
“in order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level 
of consumer protection, the Union shall contribute to protecting the health, 
safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their 
right to information, education and to organise themselves in order to 
safeguard their interests.”
EU trade policies must be in line with these provisions. Moreover, Article 38 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights also says that EU “policies shall ensure a 
high level of consumer protection”.
The EU and the US started a dialogue regarding consumer issues already in 
1998: the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (“TACD”),105 which serves as a hub for 
consumer organisations to discuss policy issues on both sides of the Atlantic. The 
TACD regularly issues statements, letters, recommendations and criticism regarding 
issues it fi nds important. Such issues cover a wide range of topics like genetically 
modifi ed organisms (“GMOs”), e-commerce, data privacy, intellectual property, 
fair trade and medicines. The core topic in this regard is “regulatory cooperation”, 
i.e. the harmonisation of standards between the US and the EU. Already in 1998, 
the US and the EU concluded a Mutual Recognition Agreement (“MRA”).106 
Later, a US-EU “Regulatory Cooperation Roadmap” was adopted in 2002, which 
already implemented sixteen sectors into the cooperation by 2005.107 In 2007, the 
105 See: http://tacd.org/?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1
106 Chase–Pelkmans [2015], p. 8; Ahearn [2009].
107 Roadmap for EU-U.S. Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency. IP/04/816 Brussels, 29 June 
2004.
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Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) was founded, aiming to further improve 
harmonisation. By this time, US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was having 
over 1,000 contacts a year with its European counterparts.108 In 2012, President 
Obama issued an executive order to reach further development.109 From the point of 
view of TTIP, this cooperation means that the US and the EU try to adopt common 
standards (including consumer goods) to more areas than before. According to the 
Commission, these standards cause technical barriers to trade, and thus harm trade 
in sectors like goods and services, automotive or the pharmaceutical industry: if 
a European company would like to sell goods in the US, diff erences in standards 
might cause serious expenses. Such standards can be technical and health-related 
standards, measures on pre-shipment inspections, but also subsidies, distribution 
restrictions or rules on procurement.110 According to a study created by scholars 
from the LSE, 
“examples of the estimated trade costs/tariff  equivalents of such regulatory 
‘non-tariff  barriers’, suggest a 20% average for all sectors, with motor 
vehicles being a bit higher than this and food and drink being signifi cantly 
higher.”
Other studies also suggest that abolishing diff erences in regulations “could yield 
economies of production worth $150 billion a year in the EU, and $117 billion a year 
in the US”.111
The EU fi rst published a commentary for regulatory cooperation112 as well as the 
concrete draft of the text,113 and later it amended the draft114 and the text in 2016.115 
Moreover, special rules on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures can be found in a 
related document,116 and also those on motor vehicles,117 chemicals,118 pharmaceutical 
108 Chase–Pelkmans [2015], p. 8.
109 Executive Order 13609 of May 1, 2012 Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation. 
Federal Register Vol. 77, No. 87, Friday, May 4, 2012. See: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
fi les/omb/inforeg/eo_13609/eo13609_05012012.pdf
110 Donat et al. [2014]
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products119 and medical devices.120 The parties also introduce an EU-US Annual 
Regulatory Cooperation Programme,121 i.e. yearly meetings of representatives 
from both sides of the Atlantic. They also consult on the Joint Annual Regulatory 
Cooperation Program with a “domestic Advisory Group composed by businesses 
including small and medium sized enterprises, trade unions and public interest 
groups, ensuring a balanced representation of all interests concerned”. Moreover, 
the EU supports input from industry by allowing “natural and legal persons to 
present proposals to improve the regulatory environment”.122 It was also expressed 
that “TTIP provisions are meant to support compatible outcomes where regulators 
identify common interests” – this means that in the case of diff erent interests, 
regulations may remain diff erent.
5.2. Criticism
Regulatory cooperation received a lot of criticism from diff erent organisations, 
mainly from NGOs like Corporate Observatory or Greenpeace. 
Firstly, it was said that TTIP may lead to a “race to bottom”,123 which means that 
traditionally harsh EU consumer standards could get “watered down”. However, the 
situation seems to be more diffi  cult. As Jonathan B. Wiener and Alberto Alemanno 
put it,
“ fears that agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) would require Europe to lower its regulatory standards 
are based on a premise that European standards are typically more stringent 
than U.S. standards. But as just noted, the reality is that although some 
European regulatory standards for some issues are more stringent than U.S. 





121 Article X.6. See: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154377.pdf
122 Point 4., See: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154378.pdf
123 The TTIP Gap: How a Trans-Atlantic Trade Deal Can Still Be Fixed. See: http://www.spiegel.
de/international/world/how-ttip-and-an-eu-us-free-trade-deal-can-be-fi xed-a-1036831.html
124 See: Alemanno–Wiener [2016], p. 102; Alemanno [2014]: Expo/B/Afet/2013/32 Pe 433.847, 
European Parliament Policy Report, Brussels, April 2014 See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/etudes/join/2014/433847/EXPO-AFET_ET(2014)433847_EN.pdf p. 23 seq.
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The EU’s answer to the criticism was that they emphasised that the parties do 
not plan to give up EU standards. According to their claim, regulatory cooperation 
remains voluntary and is not imposed on the parties. Furthermore, the race to the 
bottom is not as common as critics claim. As Peter Chase and Jacques Pelkmans put 
it, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue
“was also strongly encouraging great regulatory cooperation in automotive 
safety. This failed when the US regulator (the National Highway Transport 
Safety Agency, NHTSA) undertook extensive studies about certain specifi c 
auto safety features (e.g., on standards for side door crash resistance) 
which demonstrated that EU vehicles were less safe than their American 
counterparts. This experience again underscores some of the lessons learned 
in the earlier MRAs – that regulators cannot and will not lower safety 
standards just to promote trade, and that they depend on hard evidence, 
rather than political good will.”125
In order to decide whether the agreed standards hurt EU consumer standards, 
we should analyse the concrete, fi nal and detailed text of the agreement, which is not 
yet available,126 even if leaked documents are available on the internet.127 The latest 
documents on negotiations also seem confusing.128 On the other hand, the text needs 
to be clearer to fulfi l its purpose and maintain a high level of consumer protection, 
and all the costs and benefi ts must be taken into consideration.129 Based on the offi  cial 
materials, it seems to be impossible to decide whether they are actually benefi cial or 
not, because we neither know details about the negotiations, nor do we have the fi nal 
and detailed text in hand.
Secondly, there is an on-going dispute on the precautionary principle. According 
to public opinion (especially in the EU), materials and processes can only be put to 
market once proven harmless,130 while in the US they can be banned from the market 
only after they have been proven harmful. On the other hand, the legal background 
is by far more complex than that. As Cass R. Sunstein puts it,
125 See: Chase–Pelkmans [2015], p. 7.
126 See: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230#regulatory-cooperation
127 See: https://ttip-leaks.org/
128 See: The Twelfth Round of Negotiations for the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) Public Report – March 2016. See: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/
march/tradoc_154391.pdf
129 Alemanno–Wiener [2016], p. 122. et seq.
130 Vecchione [2012–2013].
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“this opposition between Europe and America is false, even illusory. It is 
simply wrong to say that Europeans are more precautionary than Americans. 
As an empirical matter, neither is “more precautionary.” Europeans are not 
more averse to risks than Americans. They are more averse to particular 
risks, such as the risks associated with global warming; but Americans have 
their own preoccupations as well.”131
He also writes that “European practice is quite complex”. To take just one 
example, “Europe has been more precautionary about hormones in beef, while 
the US has been more precautionary about mad cow disease (“BSE”) in beef and 
blood donations.”132 European nations have taken a highly precautionary approach 
to genetically modifi ed foods, but the United States has been more aggressive in 
controlling the risks associated with carcinogens in food additives. In the context 
of occupational risk, American law is far more precautionary than Swedish law.133 
Critics claim, in the future, as a result of TTIP, several materials may be put on the 
European market which are potentially harmful, e.g. in the cosmetic industry. It is 
true that the method applied in the US can cause some dangers. On the other hand, 
there are also opinions, which claim that these problems can be overcome:
“several studies have demonstrated that, with some possible exceptions, the 
high standards required by both the EU and US will ensure a high level 
of consumer, health and environmental protection ... “ and some studies 
suggest that “diff erences between precaution and science-based risk 
assessment have been overplayed and that diff erences are more due to a 
selective application of precaution to diff erent risks in diff erent places and 
times.”134
Furthermore, the precautionary principle is also set out in Article 191(2) TFEU, 
which expressly states that environmental policy should be based on the precautionary 
principle. So it cannot be “negotiated away” as simply, as claimed in the media by 
critics, since MSs would have to amend TFEU to do so.135 
Third, there is an on-going dispute regarding genetically modifi ed organisms 
(GMO products). The EU already had international disputes regarding GMO food, 
131 Sunstein [2005], p. 14.
132 Ibid.
133 Sunstein [2005], p. 20.
134 Woolcock et al. [2015].
135 Leaked TTIP documents confi rm major risks for climate, environment and consumer safety. 
See: http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/press/releases/2016/Leaked-TTIP-documents-
confi rm-major-risks-for-climate-environment-and-consumer-safety/ P. 21.
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when in 2006 WTO dispute settlement found the EU ban of GMO food to be contrary 
to WTO rules.136 After that, the EU still maintained that “only GMOs that pose no 
risk to human and animal health or the environment may be cultivated in the EU”. 
In 2010, it allowed MSs to ban GMO food (in fact, it transferred power to them),137 
in 2015138 also moved into a more liberal direction (allowed states to introduce ban 
more easily) and created an authorisation system.139 Critics claim GMO food or 
chlorine chickens could arrive in Europe, because the US uses TTIP negotiations 
to attack EU laws.140 However, if the situation remains as it is now, according to 
offi  cial statements, this area will not to be aff ected by TTIP. Furthermore, as an 
agreement falling under shared competency, it is up to Member States to adhere to 
their standards. Hopefully, GMO labelling will also remain as before.141 This does 
not preclude that the EU could take an unfortunate step and lower its standards 
even without the TTIP.142 Please note that even apart from this problem, diff erent 
standards in the US meat industry143 could badly aff ect European farmers, because 
of cost effi  ciency reasons.
Fourthly, critics also claim the TTIP’s rules on regulatory cooperation could 
harm democracy and transparency. According to the text, the parties would create 
a body that would include representatives of the US government and EU agencies. 
Draft legislation on regulatory aff airs would have to pass through this regulatory 
council before being put to a vote in the EU, or by MSs’ Parliaments.144 Critics 
claim such a solution may harm democracy and bind governments’ hands. Forty-
fi ve organisations including Corporate Europe Observatory have protested against 
136 Cheyne [2008]; Thomison [2007]; Kolsky Lewis [2013–2014]; Eliason [2008–2009].
137 GMOs: Member States to be given full responsibility on cultivation in their territorie. See: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-921_en.htm
138 More freedom for MSs to decide on the GMOs use for food and feed. IP/15/4777 Brussels, 
22 April 2015; Directive (EU) 2015/412 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2015 amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for the MSs to restrict or prohibit the 
cultivation of genetically modifi ed organisms (GMOs) in their territory Text with EEA relevance. OJ 
L 68, 13.3.2015, pp. 1–8.
139 See: http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/authorisation/cultivation/index_en.htm
140 US Using TTIP As Vehicle To Attack European Gmo Laws. See: http://ttip2016.eu/blog/
GMOs%20TTIP%20EFSA.htm
141 Agriculture Commissioner promises GMO labelling, despite TTIP. See: http://www.euractiv.
com/section/agriculture-food/news/agriculture-commissioner-promises-gmo-labelling-despite-ttip/




144 Chase–Pelkmans [2015], p. 15.
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this solution. As they put it, “the proposal makes it possible for the US to exert 
undue infl uence at a very early stage of decision-making, before any proposal is 
considered by elected bodies, namely the Council and the European Parliament.”145 
On the other hand, according to the offi  cial reasoning, this method would ensure that 
such proposals are in conformity with TTIP, and also make a transparent framework 
for lobbying. Other critics also claimed that the EP’s regulatory sovereignty could be 
in danger. Other opinions claim 
“that the EP’s regulatory sovereignty – in terms of the legislative, rule-
making ability – is unlikely to be aff ected by the TTIP. The discussion of 
the Commission’s recently published paper on regulatory cooperation has 
shown that the provisions are procedural and intended to promote, guide, 
monitor and help facilitate regulatory cooperation.”146
I believe the truth must lie somewhere in between these positions. Even though 
it is not true that legislation would be limited in the future (the body would not have 
the power to overrule or amend legislation), creating such a system seems to be 
useless and its existence could aff ect democracy negatively: it is like the outsourcing 
of certain parts of legislative action. Consequently, even if adopted, its power must 
be limited, and we need clearly expressed, limited rules on its duties and authority. 
5.3. Preliminary Findings
In summary, one could agree with the claims that regulatory cooperation contains 
risks, which must be carefully analysed in order to avoid later damages.147 However, 
the concrete details at the present time are not suffi  cient to make a judgment about its 
eff ect on consumer standards.
6. Conclusions 
If we summarise the above mentioned problems, we can ascertain the following.
Regarding transparency, even though the Commission did not breach EU rules 
during negotiations, it seems obvious that being more transparent could serve 
democracy better. Documents created for negotiations are not useful for this purpose, 
145 TTIP: “Regulatory Cooperation” a threat to democracy. See: http://corporateeurope.org/
international-trade/2016/03/ttip-regulatory-cooperation-threat-democracy
146 Woolcock et al. [2015], p. 23.
147 Alemanno [2015], p. 11.
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because they represent a highly technocratic thinking, the European public still does 
not know too much about the strategy behind these documents, and will have fears.148 
The EU should openly express the values it would not give up for commercial gain, 
and also fi nd those existing provisions in the acquis and in MSs’ law, which cannot 
be changed. The same can be said about proper rules on environmental protection. 
In theory, the right to a healthy environment could be hurt by an agreement, which 
limits States’ rights to amend their related policies, or at least could make them 
pay compensation. Poor wording could have a detrimental eff ect on environmental 
protection. Moreover, the EU rules on GMO should not be watered down, and the 
agreement should contain provisions, which allow MSs to ban GMOs, in conformity 
with the present state of EU law. The EU should not give up labelling GMO products, 
since this is also a typical European value citizens do not want to give up. The ban on 
animal testing should be openly maintained in the future as well. The text should be 
explicit on this issue. Most of these problems can be cured relatively easily.
On the other hand, we can also ascertain that a majority of criticism is based 
on misinformation, fear, prejudice and demagoguery, which can have a detrimental 
eff ect on peoples’ opinion in Europe, and on the democratic exercise of rights in 
general. 
In summary, TTIP is not the hazardous deal it is portrayed to be in the mass 
media or by populists, but it contains some risks which must be cured to achieve a 
cooperation with the US which could work for a longer term.
Moreover, it would be useful to ask for the CJEU’s opinion before the conclusion 
of the agreement, which could analyse the connection of the text and primary legal 
sources. Moreover, it could also highlight if there is a confl ict with secondary sources, 
or a confl ict of legislative competencies between the EU and Member States.
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